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TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
Richard R. Carlson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, an increasing number of adoptions
in the United States involve the adoption of children of foreign birth.'
These adoptions have increased, while the yearly number of total adop-
tions has leveled off and possibly even declined.2 Various social develop-
ments have combined to limit the availability of adoptable American-
born children at the same time that social, legal, and practical restraints
against transnational adoptions have receded.' Once rarely contem-
plated, transnational adoption is now a significant and widely publicized
option for prospective adoptive parents who are discouraged by the
shortage of healthy adoptable infants born in the United States.4
* Assistant Professor, South Texas College of Law; J.D. University of Georgia.
1. Lindsey, Adoption Market: Big Demand, Tight Supply, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1987, § 1, at 1,
col. 4.
2. Id.
3. Id. The National Committee for Adoption estimates that the number of adoptions between
unrelated persons declined from 82,800 in 1971 to 50,720 in 1982. The yearly number of adoptions
may have risen slightly since 1982, but much of the increase, if any, is attributable to the growing
number of transnational adoptions. Id. The availability of adoptable American-born children has
declined because of widespread use of contraception and abortion, and because many young unmar-
ried mothers no longer feel stigmatized by motherhood out of wedlock. At the same time it is likely
that the number of persons seeking to adopt has increased, at least in part because adoption is viewed
more favorably today than in earlier times.
4. The transnational adoption alternative has received considerable publicity in newspapers
and news magazines during the past few years. See, eg., Lindsey, supra note 1; Simons, Abductions
in Salvador Fill a Demand: Adoption, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1985, § A, at 2, col. 3; Crossen, Adopt-
ing Abroad: Battling Illness, Bureaucracy, Expenses and Racism, Wall St. J., May 21, 1985, § 2, at
1
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Transnational adoption also now constitutes significant immigration
into this country. Since 1947, which marked the beginning of transna-
tional adoption on a significant scale, over 130,000 children have immi-
grated to the United States for adoption by United States citizens or
residents, or for finalization of adoption proceedings initiated abroad.'
Like so many other immigrants, immigrant children admitted into the
United States for the purpose of adoption have often come to this coun-
try because of war, catastrophe, poverty, or intolerance in their birth
lands.6 The flow of children immigrating to the United States for the
purpose of adoption has occurred in a series of waves, generated by crises
and social conditions throughout the world.7 Once, immigrant adoptive
children were almost exclusively European in origin. Today, most are
from Asia and Latin America.' Over the past forty years every continent
and nearly every nation has contributed to the pool of immigrant chil-
dren arriving in the United States for adoption.9 In 1985 alone, children
who immigrated for the purpose of adoption represented over sixty dif-
ferent nations. 0
Because transnational adoption involves both a federal concern and
responsibility over immigration matters, as well as a state concern and
responsibility for the placement and adoption of children,11 coordination
33, col. 4; Kuntz, The Foreign Connection, Forbes, Dec. 31, 1984, at 128; Rule, Couples Taking
Unusual Paths for Adoptions, N.Y. Times, Jul. 26, 1984, § A, at 1, col. 3; As Adoptions Get More
Difficult - U.S. News & World Rep., June 25, 1984, at 62; How to Adopt a Child in Mexico: Three-
Stage Process, L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1984, § V, at 26, col. 1.
5. Alien Adopted Children, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 71 (1977); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATU-
RALIZATION SERVICE, 1984 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, Table IMM 2.5. As of 1985, transnational
adoptions by United States citizens were occurring at a rate of over 9,000 per year. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Computer Printout of Immigrants Admitted by
Class of Admission and Country of Birth, Fiscal Year 1985, Detail Run 401 (hereinafter Detail Run
401) (unpublished material available at Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C.).
The number of transnational adoptions may be slightly understated by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (the Service) because one type of transnational adoption, in
which the adoptee arrives in the U.S. after having been adopted abroad at least two years
earlier, is not included in the Service's count of immigrant adoptees.
Alien Adopted Children, supra, at 31 (statement of John Dewitt, Deputy Administrator of the Bu-
reau of Security and Consular Affairs, Dept. of State). The Service's figures also do not include
immigrant adoptive children entering the United States in a "nonpreference" status, although the
number of such immigrant adoptees is probably very small. Id. at 45. See also infra note 163.
6. See generally Simons, supra note 4.
7. See id.; see also 56 Orphaned by War Due Today at Idlewild, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1949, at
8, col. 5; Jones, Intercountry Adoptions and Immigration Laws: Issues and Proposals, reprinted in
Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 115-116.
8. See generally Simons, supra note 4; Kuntz, supra note 4.
9. Detail Run 401, supra note 5.
10. See id.
11. As a form of immigration, the process of transnational adoption is under the control of the
[Vol. 23:317
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of federal and state law, and cooperation between federal and state au-
thorities, is necessary to complete the process of a transnational adop-
tion. Generally, a state court can only grant an adoption petition for a
child present within the state.12 Of course, the child can be present in the
state only after having been admitted into the United States by federal
immigration officials. 3 However, federal immigration officials can per-
mit the child to enter the United States only if they are able to determine
that (1) the child is free to be adopted, and (2) the prospective adoptive
parents are qualified to adopt. 4 In making these determinations, federal
immigration officials seek to satisfy federal standards of adoptability and
parental qualifications, but they must also be concerned with state stan-
dards, because a state court ultimately will decide whether the adoption
should be granted under state law." If immigration officials are satisfied
that the child is adoptable,' 6 and that the prospective adoptive parents
are qualified, they may allow the child to immigrate to the United
States. 17
Lawful entry into the United States is no guarantee that the child
can or will be adopted. The finalization of an adoption depends not only
on the approval of federal officials for the child's immigration, but also
on the requirements of state law.' 8 Because state courts exercise their
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (the Service) and the consular offices of the
Department of State. However, as a consequence of the traditional and constitutional predominance
of the states over domestic relations, including adoptions, the states have remained ultimately in
control of the finalization of the transnational adoption process. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586
(1890), a case involving a dispute over the custody of a child, where the Court stated:
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs
to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States. As to the right to the
control and possession of this child.... it is one in regard to which neither the Congress of
the United States nor any authority of the United States has any special jurisdiction.
Id. at 593-94. While this description of the federal role in domestic relations is often cited as author-
itative, in retrospect it is an overstatement. From time to time there has been a need for federal
involvement when a matter of domestic relations touches some established federal interest. Federal
involvement in transnational adoption, which affects immigration policy, is one example. Another
example is federal regulation of the placement of Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
12. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAw, pt. 4, § 15.3 (1st ed. 1977).
13. See generally Simons, supra note 4.
14. Id See Jones, supra note 7; As Adoptions Get More Difficult, supra note 4.
15. Jones, supra note 7, at 117.
16. The term "adoptable" may have different meanings depending on whether it is used in a
legal, medical, or sociological sense. As used in this article, "adoptable" means legally free for
adoption.
17. Jones, supra note 7, at 117.
18. In most cases, a child whose immigration is approved will be successfully adopted under
state law without controversy. Immigration officials will have successfully predicted that a state
court would grant the adoption, and they may have been aided in this regard by state officials.
3
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jurisdiction over adoptions independently of federal immigration offi-
cials, 19 a state court may disagree that an immigrant child is adoptable.
If it does, it will deny the petition for adoption despite the child's lawful
immigration to the United States for the purpose of adoption.20
An added complication in a transnational adoption is that the child
ordinarily has been freed or relinquished for adoption in a foreign land
under foreign law.21 Foreign relinquishment is an essential step in the
transnational adoption process, for if the child has never been properly
relinquished, the child is not adoptable.22 A state court becomes in-
volved in the process only after the child's relinquishment and immigra-
tion, and it therefore exercises no control over the relinquishment
process. If a state court disapproves of the manner by which the child
was relinquished, it can only deny the petition for adoption.
Despite the interdependence of the foreign relinquishment, United
States immigration, and state adoption processes, each is governed by
entirely separate bodies of law. State adoption laws are generally quite
highly developed, yet devoid of any specific recognition or acknowledge-
ment of transnational adoption.23 Federal lawmakers and regulators, on
the other hand, have developed a body of immigration law which ad-
dresses transnational adoption specifically, but which focuses primarily
on the immigration aspects.24 The foreign law regulating relinquishment
may be based on totally different concepts than those embodied in United
States common law. As a result, the law and process of transnational
adoption remains disjointed. Most transnational adoptions succeed de-
spite the lack of forthright law, but the failure of lawmakers to provide a
clear process creates unnecessary risks and uncertainties.
Legislative reform at the federal level is one solution to the deficien-
cies in the existing transnational adoption process. However, to ade-
quately analyze potential legislation, one must first understand the
history of transnational adoption and of the federal legislative reforms
and social phenomena that have encouraged transnational adoption on
an increasingly significant scale. Also necessary is a clear picture of the
19. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); Jones, supra note 7, at 117.
20. See As Adoptions Get More Difficult, supra note 4.
21. See generally Crossen, supra note 4; As Adoptions Get More Difficult, supra note 4.
22. See generally Crossen, supra note 4; As Adoptions Get More Difficult, supra note 4.
23. Even where state legislation recognizes transnational adoption, it often fails to address all
the potential problems of transnational adoption.
24. Federal lawmakers traditionally have abstained from the regulation of adoptions, and even




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/1
TRANSNA TIONAL ADOPTION
existing transnational adoption process, beginning with a child's relin-
quishment for adoption in a foreign land, continuing with the child's im-
migration to the United States, and ending with the child's adoption in a
state court proceeding. Finally, one must analyze the specific shortcom-
ings of the existing system created by the shared and often conflicting
foreign, federal, and state authority over transnational adoptions.
II. THE HISTORY OF TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION
A. The Development of Federal Policy
Federal immigration law concerning adoption has evolved as a re-
sult of major shifts in the sources and causes of transnational adoption.
Like other forms of immigration, transnational adoption has occurred in
a series of waves, often generated by foreign wars or catastrophes. Also,
following the pattern of other forms of immigration, immigration by
transnational adoption periodically has shifted in origin from one region
of the world to another. Transnational adoptions by United States citi-
zens were apparently quite rare prior to World War II,25 but the popular-
ization of transnational adoption after World War II created a major
transition in American attitudes toward adoption during the last
century. 6
1. Pre World War II
Before the twentieth century, adoption was a novel legal process.
25. Jones, supra note 7, at 115. Statistics compiled by the Service do not show what number, if
any, of immigrants arriving in the United States before 1948 were adoptable children being brought
to this country for placement with American families. In fact, until 1948 there were no special
adoption provisions in federal immigration statutes and no statistical category for prospective adop-
tive children in the records maintained by the Service. Special legislation was not needed until after
World War II, because until that time transnational adoption was very rare. Prior to World War II
and during the course of the war the Service reported one category of immigrants described as
persons "under 16 years of age, unaccompanied by parent." Only a trickle of immigrants entered
the United States under this category. For example, from 1935 through 1945 an average of 14
immigrants per year were counted in this category. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT Table 20 (1947); IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT Table 20 (1944). The number of immi-
grants "under 16 years of age, unaccompanied by parent" was measured by the Service because of
statutory provisions disqualifying such persons from immigrating except at the discretion of the
Service. The primary concern of the Service in exercising this discretion appears to have been to
prevent the admission of children likely to become public charges. See F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRA-
TION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (3d ed. 1975). Persons admitted under this category may
have been "unaccompanied by parent" at the time of their entry into the United States for any of a
number of reasons. They were not necessarily immigrating for the purpose of being adopted in the
United States.
26. See generally Rule, supra note 4.
1988]
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As a means of creating a parent-child relationship for all purposes under
the law, adoption was alien to the common law tradition of most states.27
However, providers for orphans did not see adoption as the ultimate goal
in arranging for an orphan's care and upbringing. An orphan was more
likely to be apprenticed in the service of a paternalistic employer or left
in an institution.28 Furthermore, adoption was not a widely-accepted so-
lution for childless couples. Social conventions placed great value in a
true "blood line" to such an extent that an adoptive child was not a
"solution" to childlessness but a burden accepted as an act of charity.29
An orphan might be placed in the custody of a family; however, without
a legal process for adoption or a motivation to adopt, the foster parents
were caretakers only and not the legal equivalent of the child's parents.
State government initiated the creation of a legal process for adop-
tion and regulation of adoption practices due to the state's role as parens
patriae3 0 Adoption law fits naturally within the sphere of traditional
state concerns, because adoption is one means of providing care, supervi-
sion, and education of minors. In addition, like marriage and divorce
law, adoption law gives legal recognition to the power of the state to
dissolve one family and create another. Adoption law also interacts with
state property law to determine who is an "heir" or a "child" for pur-
poses of the distribution and descent of property."1
By the middle of the twentieth century, adoption laws were enacted
27. Howe, Adoption Practice, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17 FAM L. Q. 173, 175 (1983); Ex
parte Clark, 87 Cal. 638 (1891). In some states, early adoption served a limited purpose of perpetu-
ating heirship, but generally did not endow the adoptive children and parents with all the other legal
attributes of a birth family. Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. RPv. 332, 341 (1922).
See, eg., Eckford v. Knox, 67 Tex. 200, 204, 2 S.W. 372, 374 (1886) (Texas statute "gives to the
adopted party the position of a child only so far as to make him the heir of his adopter, but does not
constitute him a member of the latter's family, with such duties and privileges as that relation would
imply"). See also Adoption and Foster Placement of Children: Report of the Expert Group Meeting
on Adoption and Foster Placement of Children, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/99, 2 (1980).
28. See Howe, supra note 27, at 176. An early American solution for homeless children was
"putting out" the children for service and apprenticeship. Kawashima, Adoption in Early America
20 J. FAM. L. 677, 680-81, 682, 685-86 (1981-82). Local courts were often authorized by law to
assign orphans or impoverished children to apprenticeships. See, eg., Manual v. Beck, 70 Misc. 357,
127 N.Y.S. 266 (1910). In the mid-nineteenth century, children's aid societies collected thousands of
homeless children from the streets of eastern cities and sent them westward to work on farms.
Howe, supra note 27, at 176.
29. R. SIMON & H. ALStEIN, TRANsRACIAL ADOPTION 9 (1977); Kawashima, supra note 28,
at 682.
30. Parenspatriae is a guardian of minors and other legally disabled persons within the state's
jurisdiction. See Arnold v. Arnold, 246 Ala. 86, 18 So. 2d 730, 734 (1944); Wentzel v. Montgomery
General Hospital, 293 Md. 68, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982).
31. See generally Kawashima, supra note 28; Brosnan, supra note 27.
[Vol. 23:317
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/1
TRANSNA TIONAL ADOPTION
with regard to American born children, but were unnecessary with re-
gard to foreign born children.3" Adoption of foreign-born children was
neither necessary nor favored. Adoptable American-born children were
available in abundance without extended waiting periods and for little or
no adoption fee.33 In addition, the concept that adoption should "mirror
biology" predominated in adoption law and in the practices of adoption
agencies and adoptive parents. The focus of this view was to match
adoptive parents with children who, by outward appearance, could have
been birth children.34 Adoption of an immigrant child born to parents of
a different culture, and especially adoption of an immigrant child of a
different race, would have been the antithesis of an adoption mirroring
biology.
Aside from the public's lack of interest in adoption of foreign born
children, transnational adoption also was impeded by restrictive immi-
gration laws that limited the eligibility of adoptable children for immi-
gration.35 Early restrictive immigration legislation did not address the
subject of adoption, but would have discouraged transnational adop-
tion.36 For example, under legislation enacted in 1907, children "unac-
companied by their parents" could be excluded at the discretion of
32. The first American adoption statute was enacted in Massachusetts in 1851. See Howe,
supra note 29, at 175-76. By 1931, most states had provided some legal process for adoption. See
Brosnan, supra note 27, at 335; SIMON & ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at 18.
The number of adoptions multiplied rapidly from 1920 to 1950. Perlman & Wiener, Adoption
of Children, 1953: A Statistical Analysis, 40 IowA L. REv. 336 (1955); Comment, Moppets on the
Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 716 (1950).
33. Perlman & Weiner, supra note 32, at 336. Adoption generally involved no "adoption fee,"
aside from court and attorney fees, until the post war era when private adoption agencies became
increasingly involved in the process of matching adoptive children and parents. In 1950, it was
reported that agencies in New York were "experimenting" with fees ranging from $100 to $1200.
Comment, supra note 32, at 736 n.1l0.
34. The match took account of traits such as age, race, and physical resemblances between the
adoptive parents, the adoptive child, and birth parents. See Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5
FAM. ADVOC. 9, 9 (1982); R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at 10, 12-17; I. ELLMAN, P.
KURTZ & A. STANTON, FAMILY LAW 1254-62 (1986); C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES &
MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 367-97 (3d ed. 1985). Frequently the effort to create seemingly ho-
mogeneous adoptive families went far beyond these criteria. Adoption statutes not only prohibited
interracial adoption, but often prohibited or discouraged matching adoptive parents of one religion
with a child whose birth parents were of another religion. R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29,
at 13-14. Many adoption agencies attempted to match adoptive parents with children whose birth
parents were of similar education, intelligence, cultural background, and even geographic residence.
Id.; C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & A. SANDER, supra, at 367-397.
35. See, eg., Act of Feb. 20, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898 (1907); Samuels, They Call It
Home, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1949, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, col. 3; Jones, supra note 7, at 118; Dewitt,
supra note 5, at 32.
36. The reason the early legislation had little actual effect on transnational adoptions is simply
that few transnational adoptions were taking place. The first impetus for transnational adoption on
1988]
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immigration officials.37
Immigration law became increasingly restrictive with the introduc-
tion of the "quota" system in 1921, so that an important factor in any
alien, foreign-born child's eligibility for immigration was his country of
origin and the quota assigned to that country.3 Foreign-born natural
children of United States citizens were not subject to this quota system,
and were admitted to the United States without numerical limits. 39
Adopted children, however, were denied "nonquota status."'  A system
of "preferences" setting priorities for various classes of persons seeking toimmigrate existed within each quota to which an adopted or adoptable
child would have been assigned.41 Therefore, a child adopted overseas or
arriving in the United States for the purpose of being adopted, would
have been relegated to "fourth preference" status, which often was tanta-
mount to exclusion.42
2. Post World War II
The restrictions of immigration law on transnational adoption were
of little consequence as long as prospective adoptive parents did not con-
template transnational adoption. When significant numbers of Ameri-
cans began to attempt transnational adoptions, however, the initial and
most obvious obstacle was federal immigration law. As a result, the first
a noteworthy scale was public sympathy toward the victims of war. After World War I, the Ameri-
can armed forces and various private groups organized relief efforts for European "war orphans."
Most of these relief efforts were designed to support European orphanages and did not result in
transnational adoptions, but at least one private relief agency acted to bring war orphans to the
United States. As a result of that organization's successful appeal to immigration officials, at least
fifty children immigrated to the United States to be adopted by American citizens.
37. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899 (1907). This restriction was
by no means an absolute bar to transnational adoption, but few children were admitted to the United
States under this provision. See supra note 25. Ship Brings 50 Jewish Orphans, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2,
1921, at 14, col. 2; Plea for Jewish Orphans, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1919, at 11, col. 2.
38. The First Quota Law, Act of May 22, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-154, 40 Stat. 559 (1921), was
the first of a series of immigration quotas. The law limited the number of immigrants from any
particular nation to a percentage of foreign born persons of that nationality living in the United
States in 1910. Id. Later quotas were based on the number of foreign born persons of each national-
ity living in the United States in 1890. See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat.
153 (1924). Immigrants from independent nations of the western hemisphere were not subject to
numerical limitations until 1968. See Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911
(1965).
39. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 4, 43 Stat. 155 (1924).
40. Id, § 28(m), 43 Stat. at 169. A "child" of an American citizen, entitled to admission on a
nonquota basis, was defined so as to exclude children by adoption unless the adoption took place
before January 1, 1924. Id.
41. See F. AUERBACH, supra note 25, at 132-34.
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important legislative measures for transnational adoption were at the fed-
eral level.43
After World War II, two developments stirred widespread interest
in transnational adoption and led to a series of immigration law amend-
ments designed to facilitate transnational adoption. The first of these
developments was public concern for victims of the war. The second
development was the increased demand for adoptable children, which
grew faster than the supply of adoptable American-born children.
The initial impetus for federal transnational adoption legislation was
public concern for the victims of World War II. The war and the subse-
quent political division of Europe inflicted civilian casualties and disloca-
tions on an unprecedented scale, leaving millions of refugees, including
many thousands of children whose parents were missing, deceased, or
unable to provide adequate care.4 European nations struggling to re-
cover from the war were unable to place thousands of adoptable children,
and institutional facilities for the care of such children were modest at
best.45 During the first three years after the end of hostilities, many
United States armed services personnel, struck by the plight of these chil-
dren, adopted children while overseas and returned with them to the
United States.4 6 Immigration laws, however, still served to impede the
immigration of children adopted overseas or brought to the United States
for the purpose of adoption.47
In 1948, Congress enacted the Displaced Persons Act48 to allow for
expedited immigration of over 200,000 European refugees from regions
of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The Act contained a provision for the
immigration of 3,000 "displaced orphans," who would be admitted re-
gardless of whether the quotas for their national origin had already been
filled, and without being charged to the quotas.4 9 Insofar as its concern
for transnational adoption, however, the Displaced Persons Act was of
43. See Jones, supra note 7, at 118; Simon, supra note 29, at 17-18.
44. See Samuels, supra note 35.
45. Id.
46. See Samuels, supra note 35; Blonde, 2, Disrupts La Guardia Work, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1948, § 1, at 35, col. 2; Foster Grandparents Cross Nation to See Twin German Girls Adopted by Army
Major, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1948, at 25, col. 6.
47. Moreover, there did not yet exist any private or public institutions designed to facilitate
transnational adoption by parents who were not stationed overseas and were not able to travel for
the purpose of adopting overseas.
48. Pub. L. No. 774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
49. The Displaced Persons Act was only incidentally concerned with the immigration of or-
phaned children, and then only as a humanitarian gesture to relieve a European problem rather than
to increase the availability of adoptable children for Americans. Id. §§ 2(e), 3(b), 62 Stat. at 1010.
The Congressional debates leading to the passage of the Displaced Persons Act focused on the larger
1988]
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limited vision. Its purpose was not to facilitate transnational adoption
for the benefit of United States citizens or for orphan children generally,
but to relieve an emergency refugee problem." To invoke the benefits of
the orphan provision, a potential sponsor need not assert that a child had
been or would be adopted, but only that the child, if admitted, would be
"cared for properly."51 Reflecting the law's purpose to address a specific,
temporary, and emergency condition, the non-quota provisions of the
Act expired automatically after two years. 2
The orphan provisions of the Displaced Persons Act were the first of
a series of temporary, one to three year measures that provided a contin-
uous statutory basis for limited transnational adoption over the next dec-
ade. Each amendment or extension provided for several thousand
nonquota visas for adoptable European children. Eventually, the defini-
tion of "displaced orphan" was broadened to include children of other
regions and other circumstances. In part, this loosening of the orphan
provisions occurred because as European refugees were gradually placed
or resettled, crises in other corners of the world created new refugee
problems. 4
While public concern for war victims was having an effect on federal
policy, the second development, an increased demand for adoptable chil-
dren, also began to propel the reform of immigration laws restricting
transnational adoption. Although the immediate post-war years had
seen increased numbers of available adoptable children, 5 by the early
fifties the balance was shifting, and it became increasingly difficult to
purpose of the Act, which was to allow the immigration of refugees. The "orphan" provisions
evoked no reported discussion. See, eg., 94 CONG. REc. 7727-69, 8854-63 (1948).
50. Congress, however, perceived the emergency to be limited in duration and geography.
Thus, the provision for quota free immigration applied only to children in regions of Germany,
Austria, and Italy. Id. However, many of the orphans eligible under this provision were children of
East European descent who had been removed to Germany by the Nazis during the course of the
war. 56 Orphaned by War Due Today at Idlewild, supra note 7. In addition, only children who were
orphans because of the death or disappearance of both parents were eligible to be classified as "dis-
placed orphans." Displaced Persons Act of 1948, § 2(e), 62 Stat. at 1010. No provision was made
for non-quota immigration of other adoptable children, such as those relinquished for adoption by
living parents unable to provide adequate care or support.
51. Id. § 2(e), 62 Stat. at 1010.
52. Id. § 3, 62 Stat. at 1010.
53. See generally F. AUERBACH, supra note 25.
54. See generally R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29.
55. The increased availability of adoptable children was due to the "baby boom" and a rise in
the number of homes broken by death, divorce, and desertion. In addition, social welfare agencies
had come to view adoption as a goal for institutionalized orphans, and they actively promoted the
adoption of children in their charge. Perlman & Wiener, supra note 32, at 336.
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adopt American-born children. 6 The number of applications for adop-
tion was growing rapidly, without a corresponding growth in the number
of adoptable children.57 Adoption agencies in some areas began to
charge service fees for the first time. 8 Also, publicity increased concern-
ing "black market" sales of babies for exorbitant prices.5 9 As the adop-
tion of American-born children became more difficult and expensive,
increasing numbers of prospective adoptive parents filed applications
with international adoption agencies formed after enactment of the Dis-
placed Persons Act.6"
In 1950, Congress amended the Displaced Persons Act to provide
additional allotments of visas for displaced orphans for the next two
years.61 At the same time, Congress expanded the list of nations from
which an immigrant orphan, might originate. Displaced orphan visas be-
came available to qualified children from every nation of western Europe
except Spain.62 Congress also broadened the definition of "diplaced or-
phan" to include children who had been abandoned, or had one remain-
ing parent who was incapable of caring for the child and had agreed to
relinquish the child for emigration and adoption or guardianship.63
56. See Barclay, Foreign Adoptions to be Made Easier, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1952, at 18, col. 1.
57. See id.; Comment, supra note 32, at 716, 720. An important factor in the declining availa-
bility of adoptable children at this time was the decline in the adult mortality rate. In earlier years,
adult mortality had left great numbers of children without parents. In 1920, orphans were 16.3
percent of the total population. By 1953, this figure had been reduced to 5.4 percent. Simpson, No
Euphemisms: Call Them "Orphans,"N.Y. Times, May 1, 1987, § A, at 35, col. 2. At first, however,
"baby shortages" were likely to have been localized and not widespread, as there was no consensus
that a general shortage existed until the 1970's. Howe, supra note 27, at 180.
58. Comment, supra note 32, at 736 n.1 10. By 1960, most agencies charged fees ranging from
$50 to $2,000. C. FooT, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 34, at 356.
59. See, eg., Black Market Ban on Babies Expected, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1948, at 24, col. 1;
Baby-Selling Ring Found, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1948, at 4, col. 6; Comment, supra note 32; Foreign
Adoptions, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 324, 324 (1962); 103 CONG. REc. 482 (1957) (statement of Sen.
Kefauver). As early as 1948, an "international" baby-selling ring was broken up by Canadian police
in New Brunswick after it had sold at least fifty infants chiefly in New York, New Jersey, and
Delaware for prices of up to $1,500. Baby-Selling Ring Found, supra. See also the description of an
indictment of a New York attorney who had arranged "proxy" adoptions of Greek children by
Americans, in Foreign Adoptions, supra note 59, at 324.
60. Adopting Child From Overseas Found Difficult, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1955, at 26, col. 2; see
generally Barclay, supra note 56.
61. Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 555, § 3, 4, 64 Stat. 219, 221-22 (1950). The 1950
Amendment increased the original allotment for children in areas of Germany, Italy, and Austria
from 3,000 to 5,000, and extended the period during which the allotted visas could be issued into
1951. In addition, the Amendment allotted 5,000 more visas to be issued for eligible children until
1952. Id.
62. Id. 64 Stat. at 220.
63. Id. The Franco regime of Spain, which had sympathized with the Axis powers during
World War II and had received substantial support from the Axis powers before the war, was not
recognized by the United States at the time of the 1953 Amendment.
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3. The Korean Conflict
Eight days after Congress enacted the 1950 Amendment, war broke
out in Korea. As in Europe after World War II, many American mili-
tary personnel stationed in Korea during the next few years were moved
by the tragedy of Korean war orphans and sought to adopt Korean chil-
dren. Immigration quotas, however, impeded the adoption and immigra-
tion of Korean children," and the special nonqota visas provided by the
Displaced Persons Act were unavailable to non-European children. In
response to the pleas of military personnel who had adopted or were
seeking to adopt Korean children, Congress enacted emergency legisla-
tion in July, 1953. This legislation allotted up to 500 special nonquota
visas to be issued for orphans adopted or to be adopted by United States
citizens stationed abroad as members of the armed services or employees
of the United States government.6"
While this allocation was relatively small and could be used only by
United States military and government personnel, it was significant for
two reasons. For the first time, the path for immigration of adoptable
children was open to children of any nation. Even more important, the
1953 emergency allocation of orphan visas marked the first legislative
encouragement of transnational adoptions that were usually interracial in
character. The subsequent influx of Korean adoptive children was a con-
tributing factor in the gradual weakening of legal and societal taboos
against interracial adoption.
Within a month after the emergency allocation of the 500 nonquota
visas, Congress moved to restore earlier post-war refugee relief legislation
in the substantially new form of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953.66 Like
the predecessor refugee relief acts, the Act of 1953 was only secondarily
concerned with the immigration of adoptable children, being chiefly ad-
dressed to a new European refugee crisis caused by the flight of hundreds
of thousands of East Europeans from Communist rule." Nevertheless,
the Act of 1953 was a milestone toward the development of a nonrestric-
tive transnational adoption policy, because it removed once and for all
the national origin restrictions of earlier displaced orphan legislation. 68
64. See F. AUERBACH, supra note 25, at 25-6.
65. Act of July 29, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-162, 67 Stat. 229 (1953).
66. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
67. See F. AUERBACH, supra note 25, at 25. The Refugee Relief Act permitted the issuance of
214,000 nonquota visas for certain refugees, and 205,000 of these visas were set aside for refugees or
escapees from Communist nations. Id.
68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, unlike the emergency legislation of a month before, the or-
phan provisions of the Refugee Relief Act could be invoked by adoptive
parents whether or not they were employed by the United States govern-
ment and stationed abroad.69
The Refugee Relief Act allotted 4,000 nonquota visas for eligible
orphans to be issued over a three year period."0 Yet even the combined
effect of the Refugee Relief Act and the earlier emergency legislation was
insufficient to supply visas for all foreign children adopted over the
course of the next three years. Over 800 children adopted or to be
adopted by American citizens were stranded overseas without visas when
the Act automatically expired in 1956.71 Facing the prospect of months
of delay before Congressional action, the Department of Justice exercised
its parole authority72 in January, 1957, to admit these children to the
United States on a "temporary" basis until Congress could enact legisla-
tion lifting immigration restrictions against the orphans and granting
them permanent residence.73 Congress responded later the same year
with legislation that adjusted the status of the paroled Korean orphans, 74
extended the nonquota visa provision for eligible orphans for another two
year period, and, for the first time, lifted all numerical restrictions on the
issuance of such visas.75
Beginning with the Act of 1957, Congress developed the essential
scheme for today's federal immigration policy with respect to adoptable
children, but with one important exception. Even by 1957, Congress was
unprepared to commit the immigration law to a permanent policy of fa-
cilitating transnational adoption. The orphan provision of the Act of
69. 67 Stat. at 402.
70. Early drafts of the legislation, still focusing on the European problem, had allotted only
3,000 nonquota visas for orphans, but in the final version an additional 1,000 nonquota visas were
allotted to provide for increasing numbers of children being adopted in Korea. H.R. REP. No. 974,
83rd Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2103, 2120.
71. F. AUERBACH supra note 25, at 511; H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEvs 2016, 2017.
72. See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188
(1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982)).
73. F. AUERBACH, supra note 25 at 511; H.R. REP No. 1199, 85th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in
1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2016.
74. H.R. Con. Res. 89, 71 Stat. B15 (1957).
75. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 4, 71 Stat. 639 (1957) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1153 (1982 & Supp. 1986)). The 1957 Act also amended the Immigration and Nationality
Act's definition of "child" to include children who had been adopted abroad and had been in the
legal custody of the adopting parent or parents for at least two years. Id. The purpose of this
amendment was to aid American families that had adopted children while stationed abroad for
extended periods of time before returning to the United States. The amendment was of no benefit to
parents living in the United States and seeking to initiate a transnational adoption.
1988]
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1957 was again a temporary law. It would expire automatically without
further Congressional action.76 Over the next four years, two more tem-
porary laws sustained and extended the orphan provision." Not until
1961 was the Immigration and Nationality Act amended to contain a
permanent provision for the immigration of adoptable children.78 While
the 1961 amendments largely mirrored the approach developed in 1957,
the immigration of adoptable children was no longer pursuant to tempo-
rary, emergency measures, but was a permanent fixture of the immigra-
tion laws.79
B. The Growth of Transnational Adoption
After 1961, transnational adoptions by United States citizens con-
tinued to increase in number, although most children involved in trans-
national adoptions were not "war orphans" or "displaced persons." For
various reasons, even in peacetime Korea continued to lead all other na-
tions as an origin of immigrant adoptive children.80 Europe ceased to be
a primary source for immigrant adoptees because of its recovery from the
war and return to normalcy. Indeed, as prosperity returned to Europe, it
lacked sufficient numbers of adoptable children to satisfy the needs of its
own adoptive parents.8 ' Latin American and Asian nations not touched
76. Id.
77. See Act of Sept. 9, 1959, Pub. L. No. 85-253, § 2, 73 Stat. 490, 490-91 (1959) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982 & Supp. 1986)); Act of July 14, 1960, Pub, L. No. 86-648, § 7, 74
Stat. 504, 505 (1960) (later repealed).
78. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, §§ 1-4, 75 Stat. 650, 650-51 (1961) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1153, 1155 (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
79. Subsequent legislation regarding the immigration of adoptable children has continued a
trend toward greater legislative encouragement of transnational adoptions. Under early legislation,
only married couples could invoke the orphan provisions, but with the Act of Dec. 16, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-155, 89 Stat. 824 (1975) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982 & Supp. 1986)), single
parents became eligible to petition for the immigration of prospective adoptive children. Under the
Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-417, 92 Stat. 917 (1978) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101,
1154 (1982 & Supp. 1986)), Congress eliminated a rule that had generally limited adoptive parents to
no more than two immigrant children.
80. Kim & Carroll, Intercountry Adoption of South Korean Orphans: A Lawyer's Guide, 14 J.
FAM. L. 223, 223-25 (1975). In 1985, well over half of all immigrant children adopted abroad or
coming to the United States for adoption were from Korea. Korean children are available for adop-
tion in abundance because of Korea's local prejudices that discourage adoption by Koreans, the
establishment of Korean/American transnational adoption agencies, and the usually favorable atti-
tude of the Korean government, which has enacted special legislation for transnational adoption.
Ii; see also Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 23 (statement of Friends of Children), 47
(statement of the U.S. State Dept.).
81. International Adoption: The Need for a Guardianship Provision, 1 BOSTON U. INT'L L.J.
225, 227 n.14 (1982); Adoption and Foster Placement of Children, supra note 27, at 27; J. NELSON-
ERICHSEN, H. ERICHSEN & G. HALLBERG, How TO ADOPT FROM ASIA, EUROPE AND THE SOUTH
PACIFIC 51-99 (1983).
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by war became important new origins of immigrant adoptees because of
economic, religious, and cultural conditions that prevented the place-
ment of many adoptable children in those nations.8 2 During the
Vietnamese War, and for a few years after, thousands of Vietnamese war
orphans were adopted by United States citizens, and the much publicized
"babylift" of children during the fall of Saigon greatly increased public
awareness of transnational adoption. However, the Vietnamese surge of
adoptable immigrants is largely over.83 Over time, transnational adop-
tion by American citizens has ceased to be a humanitarian act to "res-
cue" war orphans, and has become a widely accepted option for couples
or even single parents seeking to create or expand families by means
other than natural birth.
The importance of this option has grown as the availablity of adopt-
able American-born children has declined. The shortage of American-
born children, which persists to this day, is the product of the conver-
gence of several social and demographic trends. First, the mortality of
parents, which was once the principal cause of the availability of children
for adoption, has declined drastically since the early part of this cen-
tury.84 Second, while the number of births out of wedlock has multi-
plied, single women are more likely to decide to keep their children.85
Finally, increased use of birth control and abortion have reduced the
number of unwanted births.86 The consequences of the shortage of
adoptable, American-born children are ever-lengthening waiting periods
and soaring costs. 87
82. In 1985, children from Asia and Latin America constituted over eighty-five percent of im-
migrant adoptees. Detail Run 401, supra note 5.
83. See R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 31, at 62-68.
84. See generally Samuels, They CallIt 'Home, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1949, § 6 (Magazine), at
38, col. 3.
85. Howe, supra note 27, at 180-81.
86. R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN supra note 29, at 11; see also C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & A. SANDER,
supra note 34, at 366; Howe, supra note 27, at 180; Adoption Market: Big Demand, Tight Supply,
supra note I, at 30; Adoption: New Frustration, New Hope, Newsweek, Feb. 13, 1984, at 80; Why
Adoptions Get Harder Every Year, U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 20, 1982, at 54.
87. Whereas adoption of an American-born child was significantly less expensive than transna-
tional adoption as late as the mid-1970's, transnational adoption today generally costs less than
adoption of an American-born child. See generally Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 84. By
some accounts, the "black market" price of a healthy white infant is as high as $50,000. WhyAdop-
tions Get Harder Every Year, supra note 86. Prospective adoptive parents are sometimes warned of
ten year waiting periods for American-born children, but adoptive parents often can expect place-
ment of a Korean-born child within a year after their application. I. ELLMAN, P. KuRTZ, & A.
STANTON, supra note 34, at 1257-58; C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & A. SANDER, supra note 34, at 397; Why
Adoptions Get Harder Every Year, supra note 86; Jones, supra note 25 at 116. However, delays in the
completion of a home study, which is required in all adoptions, may add to the time required for a
transnational adoption in some states. Article, Law and Procedure in Intercountry Adoptions by
1988]
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Were prejudice against interracial adoption not so pervasive, much
of the "shortage" might be eliminated by white/black or Anglo/Hispanic
adoptions of American-born children, because in truth, the "baby
shortage" is primarily a shortage of healthy white infants.8 8 Of all the
facets of the dictum that "adoption should mirror biology," the most
widely held belief is that parents and children should be of the same race.
But as the severity of the baby shortage increased, more and more pro-
spective adoptive parents have questioned the dictum.89
Sociological studies tracking interracial adoptions indicate that they
have been as successful as racially homogenous adoptions.90 However,
lingering institutional prejudices, local laws prohibiting interracial adop-
tion, and a backlash by some minority groups has reversed any trend
toward interracial adoption of American-born children. A few reported
court decisions testing the validity of laws prohibiting interracial adop-
tion have found government-imposed absolute bars against interracial
adoption to be unconstitutional. 91 Nevertheless, many race conscious
adoption laws or policies remain in effect, and the spirit of the interracial
adoption laws is perpetuated in the practices of private adoption agen-
cies, which in many areas collectively exercise substantial control over
the arrangement of moderately-priced adoptions.92 By express policy or
more subtle means, many adoption agencies continue to adhere to a pol-
icy that an interracial adoption should not be allowed under any
circumstances.93
California Residents, 8 U.C. DAvis L. R v. 241, 249 (1975). The laws and bureaucracy of particu-
lar foreign nations may also slow the process depending on the national origin of the child. Id.
88. Adoption Market: Big Demand, Tight Supply, supra note 1, at 30; Lee, White Couples Battle
Obstacles to Adoption of Nonwhite Children, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1987, at 1, col. 1; R. SIMON & H.
ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at vii.
89. By the late 1950's, the race barrier had already been cracked by the adoption of thousands
of Korean children. From 1958 to 1967, more interracial adoptions were fostered by the Indian
Adoption Project, which placed American Indian children born on reservations in the homes of
white adoptive parents. R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at 57-58; Howe, supra note 27, at
182. Beginning in the early 1960's, increasing numbers of white couples adopted black children. R.
SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at 26; Howe, supra note 27, at 182.
90. R. SIMON & H. ALsEiN, supra note 29; see also Rich, Transracial Adoptions: Nonwhite
Children of White Parents Found Doing Well, Wash. Post, Dec. 25, 1985, at 2, col. 5.
91. See, eg., Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family & Children's Services, 563 F.2d
1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264
(E.D. La. 1972); In re Gomez Adoption, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). Courts that have
considered the questions generally have concluded that race may be afactor in granting an adoption,
but that a state cannot impose an absolute bar against interracial adoption.
92. Lee, supra note 88. In Houston, Texas, for example, child welfare authorities refer all
healthy adoptable infants to private agencies, some of which refuse to countenance interracial adop-
tion. Only hard-to-place children, such as older or handicapped children, are placed by public
officials.
93. Crossen, supra note 4; see also correspondence with adoption agencies (available at South
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For white couples open to interracial or interethnic adoption but
frustrated by local adoption agency practices, adoption of a foreign-born
child is one important alternative. Adoption of a foreign-born child is
nearly always an interracial adoption. However, international adoption
agencies that arrange such adoptions have, by their very purpose, em-
braced interracial adoption.
Adoptive parents may choose to adopt a foreign child because of a
host of local agency restrictions regarding adoptive parent eligibility. El-
igibility restrictions may require marriage, affiliation with a particular
religion or with any established religion, medically determined infertility,
childlessness, a minimum and maximum age, or a maximum weight.94
Applicants frustrated by such requirements can often qualify to adopt a
foreign-born child. This is not to say that foreign nations and interna-
tional agencies are without minimum requirements for adoptive parents.
To the contrary, the requirements of some international agencies and for-
eign governments may be equally demanding or even more peculiar than
those of American agencies. 9" The diversity of international sources,
however, is such that out-of-mainstream applicants may be able to locate
at least one nation and one international agency for which they are
qualified.96
Texas College of Law). This institutional prejudice against interracial adoption has been fed since
the early 1970's by the hard campaigning of the National Association of Black Social Workers,
which has labeled interracial adoption "cultural and racial genocide." Lee, supra note 88; R. SIMON
& H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at 22, 44-52; Howe, supra note 27, at 182. Similar accusations were
made by Indian tribal leaders against interracial adoption of Indian children. R. SIMON & H. AL-
STEIN, supra note 29, at 55-56. Today, interracial adoption of Indian children is restricted by the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1982). Agency rules against interracial adoption have
been used not only to bar black/white adoptions, but also to bar a white couple's adoption of any
"mixed" race child. See correspondence with adoption agencies (available at South Texas College of
Law). In regions where Hispanic descent is popularly viewed as a "race," some agencies adhering to
the interracial adoption bar will not place Hispanic or part-Hispanic children with non-Hispanic
white couples. Id.
94. Correspondence, supra note 93; see also R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at 16-17.
Each agency has its own constellation of requirements. In theory, the requirements are designed to
protect "the best interests of the child," but in an era in which applicants vastly outnumber available
adoptable children, such requirements may also be used as one easy method of reducing the appli-
cant pool. C. FooTE, R. LEvY & A. SANDER, supra note 34, at 367.
95. Poland requires that at least one parent be of Polish ancestry. U.S. Couple Fight for Polish
Child: Adoption Saga, L.A. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1. The Republic of South Vietnam
requires that the adoptive parents have been married for at least ten years, that they be childless, and
that one of them be at least thirty-five years of age. Law and Procedure in Intercountry Adoptions by
California Residents, supra note 87, at 247 n.45. Pakistan prefers placement with a Pakistani Mos-
lem family, unless the birth family is Christian and requests placement with a Christian family.
Adoption and Foster Placement of Children, supra note 27, at 22.
96. For example, single parents are often disqualified or discouraged from adopting through
local United States agencies. In some other nations, there are enough adoptable children in need of
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By one estimate, transnational adoptions now constitute nearly six-
teen percent of all adoptions between unrelated persons.97 If current
trends continue, transnational adoptions could claim an even larger per-
centage of adoptions in the future.9" The principal restraint against fur-
ther increases in the number of transnational adoptions is likely to be the
reluctance of foreign governments to allow foreigners to adopt their chil-
dren.99 However, wars or other world crises will also create new sources
of adoptable children.
Transnational adoption could not occur on its present scale without
a federal immigration policy which encourages transnational adoption.
By lifting restrictions preventing or delaying the immigration of adopta-
ble children, the federal government has endorsed transnational adoption
as a means of satisfying the needs of its own citizens, as well as the needs
of homeless children in foreign lands. However, state law is also impor-
tant because transnational adoption is not only an immigration matter,
but is also a family matter. The tradition of state control over family
matters has persisted even with respect to transnational adoptions, so
that the states ultimately control whether a transnational adoption will
be granted." While federal immigration policy is designed to facilitate
placement that marital status is a less important factor. Note, The Law and Procedure ofInterna-
tionalAdoption: An Overview, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 361, 386 (1983); see also How to Adopt a
Child in Mexico, L.A. Times, Mar. 4, 1984, at 6. Although early federal "orphan" legislation dis-
qualified single adoptive parents from invoking special immigration provisions, recent amendments
have now extended the special provisions for the benefit of single adoptive parents; International
Adoption: Considering All the Families, MS., Jan. 1983, at 96. See Act of Dec. 16, 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-155, 89 Stat. 824 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
97. Adoption Market: Big Demand, Tight Supply, supra note 1, at 30.
98. See supra notes 3, 5.
99. R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at 64-65. Professors Simon and Alstein predicted
in 1977 that intercountry adoption would not succeed as a "viable alternative for childless couples
seeking to adopt. The originating countries jealously guard their children as vital national resources,
no matter how poor their situations are or how intolerable Americans would consider their living
conditions." Id. at 67. There may have been ample grounds for this prediction when it was made,
because an end was then in sight for the immigration of Indochinese orphans, and other nations had
begun to restrict transnational adoptions. Today, a number of countries forbid or discourage adop-
tion by foreigners. Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 50; Adoption and Foster Placement of
Children, supra note 27, at 27-29. See also J. ERICHSEN & H. ERICHSEN, GAMINES: HOW TO
ADOPT FROM LATIN AMERICA 145 (1981) (describing debate in Colombia over the relinquishment
of Colombian children for adoption by United States citizens). Even Korea, which has been the
recent mainstay of sources for transnational adoption, has occasionally sought to stem the flow of
adoptable children by limiting adoptions by foreigners and encouraging more adoptions by Koreans.
See Why Adoptions Get Harder Every Year, supra note 86; Adoption and Foster Placement of Chil-
dren, supra note 27, at 27. Nevertheless, the prediction that transnational adoption would cease to
be a significant avenue for adoptive parents has not come to pass. Transnational adoption of chil-
dren from Korea and other nations has continued to grow, apparently because there is no realistic
alternative for many children.
100. See generally In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
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transnational adoption, that policy has not usurped any aspect of state
control over the granting of adoptions.
Combined with the difficulties of accommodating foreign and state
law, the division of power between federal and state governments creates
risks of delay or failure in the completion of a transnational adoption.
An examination of the current steps involved in transnational adoption
illustrates the disjointed nature of the process.
III. THE PROCESS OF TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION
A. The Foreign Relinquishment of a Child for Emigration
and Adoption
The process of transnational adoption begins with a birth parent's or
foreign official's relinquishment of a child, and ends with a state court's
issuance of a final adoption decree. The child becomes available for
adoption by foreign relinquishment. A relinquishment may consist of a
formal judicial or administrative proceeding, or a private transaction in
the nation of the child's birth. Federal immigration officials require that
the process comply with United States immigration laws before a child is
granted a visa to immigrate to the United States. Thus, immigration offi-
cials exercise some control over the relinquishment of a child destined for
adoption in the United States.
However, the importance of the foreign relinquishment and the risks
of an improper and invalid relinquishment can be fully understood only
in the context of state adoption law. State courts have no control over
the relinquishment process. They are involved only in the final adoption
proceeding in the United States after the child has already immigrated,
and has become a permanent resident. Nevertheless, state requirements
are important throughout the transnational adoption process because
state law will ultimtely determine whether the adoption should be con-
summated. Although the relinquishment was pursuant to foreign law
and occurred in a foreign land, a state court might also insist that the
relinquishment be judged under the state's standards.
Although state adoption law is very diverse, one basic generalization
is possible: a child is not adoptable unless the parental rights of its birth
parents have been properly terminated. 01 In general terms, the birth
parents' rights over the child may have ceased for any of three reasons.
101. See, eg., Lee v. Superior Court, 25 Ariz. App. 55, 540 P.2d 1274 (1975). The parent-child
relationship is the most fundamental of human relationships. Once formed, whether by birth or by
operation of law, it is not lightly severed. Furthermore, the law will recognize only one family for a
1988]
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The birth parents may have surrendered their rights, the parents may
have died, or the parental rights may have been terminated through the
judicial process.
A child may become adoptable because one or both birth parents
have voluntarily relinquished the child for adoption and surrendered
their parental rights.1"2 The relinquishment may be in favor of particular
adoptive parents or it may be granted to an agency or institution to place
the child for adoption. A parent's voluntary relinquishment of a child
for adoption terminates fundamental legal rights of the parent over the
child and has far reaching and eventually irreversible consequences for
both parent and child. 10 3
Not surprisingly, state laws typically impose stringent safeguards
against a hasty, coerced, or otherwise improperly influenced parental re-
linquishment of a child for adoption. Most state laws require that a vol-
untary relinquishment be in writing and witnessed in some fashion, and a
few states require that the relinquishment be made in court.10 4 State law
may require that the relinquishment be executed only after birth, and it
may prescribe a particular form of relinquishment that clearly and
plainly alerts a birth parent to the effect of the relinquishment. 0 5 A re-
linquishment often must be absolutely or conditionally revocable for at
least a brief period of time after its execution. 106 If the child was born
out of wedlock but the birth father is known, state law may require his
consent or provide him with an opportunity to object to the adoption.'0 7
If a necessary relinquishment is omitted or is defective, the child is not
adoptable.'08 Furthermore, any adoption granted without a necessary
child, and therefore the birth parents' status as the legal parents of the child must terminate before
new parents may adopt the child.
102. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.23.060, .070, .080, (1962); AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107
(1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-102 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-84 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-114 (1984). See generally I. ELLMAN, P. KuRTz, & A. STANTON, supra note 34, at 1232,
1236-50; C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, supra note 34, at 324-34. Hunt, Obstacles to Interstate
Adoption, 9-12 (1972), reprinted in Opportunities for Adoption Act of 1977, Hearing Before the Sen.
Subcomm. on Child and Human Developments, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 298-301 (1977).
103. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(b) (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-117 (1974).
104. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-4 (1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-1-114 (1984).
105. See, eg., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-114(d) (1984).
106. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.070(b) (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-4 (1982).
107. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-7 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-45 (West 1976).
108. See, eg., Exparte Sullivan, 407 So.2d 559 (Ala. 1981) (relinquishment signed before birth
and not notarized in birth mother's presence, invalid); In re Cheryl E., 161 Cal. App.3d 587, 207
Cal. Rptr. 728 (1984) (undue influence and fraud by social worker who obtained relinquishment);
Tyson v. Dept. of Human Resources, 165 Ga. App. 414, 301 S.E.2d 485 (1983) (birth mother exe-
cuted statutory form for consent to adoption by relative; consent invalid because adoptive parent
named in the form was not a relative); Peeters v. Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund,
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relinquishment may be void and subject to challenge by parties seeking
custody of the child. 9
Even though the birth parents' legal rights over a child may have
terminated because the birth parents are deceased,110 the death of the
birth parents does not necessarily mean that the child is adoptable. The
child might first become the legal responsibility of a guardian appointed
by the birth parent's will, by a state court, or by operation of law. Such
placement with a guardian may continue for the duration of the child's
minority, or it may be only a temporary phase until the child can be
placed for adoption. Generally, the guardian must relinquish the child
for adoption in a manner similar to, but less exacting than, that of a birth
parent's relinquishment. In some states, certain relatives of a child
whose parents are deceased may be entitled to notice of an adoption pro-
ceeding, and they may be in a good position to oppose the adoption if
they want to adopt the child themselves."'
Finally, a child may become adoptable because a court intervened to
terminate the parental rights of the birth parents." 2 The birth parents'
parental rights might be terminated involuntarily in an adoption pro-
ceeding brought by the adoptive parents, or they might be terminated in
a proceeding separate from and in advance of the adoption proceeding.
In either case, involuntary termination of a living birth parent's rights is
an extreme measure reserved for cases of egregious abuse, abandonment,
desertion, neglect, or inability to support." 3 Even more than in the case
of voluntary termination of parental rights, involuntary termination re-
quires the highest safeguards and the full panoply of substantive and pro-
cedural due process rights." 4 The belief that a child would be better off
if raised by others is not a sufficient ground for terminating parental
rights. Neither is the belief that termination is, in a general way, in the
97 Ill. App. 3d 594, 423 N.E.2d 485 (1980) (relinquishment not in writing, invalid); Contreras v.
Montanez, 127 Misc. 2d 197, 485 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1985) (relinquishment signed on wrong line,
invalid).
109. See, eg., People ex rel. Marabottini v. Farr, 186 Misc. 811, 33 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1942).
110. See, eg., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 224.1 (Deering 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-61j
(West 1958).
111. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-3 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-10 (Harrison 1982).
112. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (Baldwin 1983); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2521 (Purdon 1955).
113. See generally Annotation, Validity of State Statute Providing for Termination of Parental
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child's "best interests."' 15 Preservation of the integrity of the family re-
quires that involuntary termination must not be allowed without proof of
substantial danger and harm to the child. 16 If the birth parents' rights
over the child are terminated involuntarily, their consent to the adoption
of the child is not necessary, but other relatives may still be entitled to
notice and an opportunity to oppose an adoption. 117
A child who has been legally separated from its birth parents for any
of these reasons may pass through the custody of several guardians
before the child is placed for adoption. Each guardian along the way
may have acquired rights and responsibilities with respect to the child's
future and availability for adoption.' 8 American courts have typically
shown great concern for the "chain of guardianship" of the child, in or-
der to establish that the child has been irrevocably relinquished for adop-
tion by each person who has held the power of guardianship over the
child.119
However, foreign standards for determining whether a child is
adoptable may not resemble American legal standards. In some coun-
tries, there is no law of adoption, and hence no legal concept of adopta-
bility.'20 Children whose birth parents are deceased or unable to provide
support may be taken in by relatives, friends, or neighbors according to
tradition, religious practice, or private agreement. 12  Even in nations
with modern adoption laws, local custom, ignorance, or disregard for
Western-style laws may be more potent. 122 Although the passage of pa-
rental rights from birth parents to newly appointed guardians may com-
port with local custom and tradition, the event may not be officially
115. Id. at 779.
116. Id.; In re Adoption of Hyatt, 24 Ariz. App. 170, 536 P.2d 1062 (1975).
117. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 26-10-3 (1975).
118. See, eg., People ex rel Marabottini v. Farr. 186 Misc. 811, 33 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1942).
119. See, eg., id. at 604; Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-104(c) (1977). See generally Note, International
Adoption-United States Adoption of Vietnamese Children: Vital Considerations for the Courts, 52
DEN. U.L. REv. 771, 774-77 (1975).
120. R SIMON & H. ALSTEIN, supra note 29, at 67. Ecuador, for example, has a law of adop-
tion, but apparently has no clear legal definition of adoptability. Note, supra note 96, at 386. See
also In re Rehman, 15 I.&N. Dec. 512 (BIA 1975) (Pakistan); In re Fakalata, 18 I.&N. Dec. 213
(BIA 1982) (Tonga).
121. Adoption and Foster Placement of Children, supra note 27, at 22-24; Baade, Interstate and
Foreign Adoptions in North Carolina, 40 N.C.L. REv. 691, 710 (1962); In re Fakalata, 18 I.&N. Dec.
213 (BIA 1982). In some Latin American countries, a child may be adopted simply by entering the
names of the adoptive parents as the child's birth certificate. The Service, however, would not neces-
sarily recognize such an adoption. Letter from Jean Erichsen, Supervisor of Social Work, Los Ninos
Int'l Adoption Center (Sept. 3, 1987).
122. In formerly British-ruled Kenya, for example, only twenty-six children were legally
adopted from 1933-63 despite the presence of an adoption law. Adoption and Foster Placement of
Children, supra note 27, at 22-24; see also LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LAW LIBRARY, MYA SAW SHIN
[Vol. 23:317
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In countries where modem adoption laws are in effect, the proce-
dures for determining and documenting a child's adoptability and the
procedures for effecting a relinquishment for adoption may not corre-
spond to the requirements of American law. In some countries, such as
South Korea, relatively modem and sophisticated laws exist to facilitate
not only the adoption of children, but also the emigration of children for
the purpose of adoption.124 Korea is currently the primary origin of chil-
dren immigrating to the United States for the purpose of adoption. How-
ever, even Korean procedures for establishing the adoptability of a child
do not necessarily conform to American standards of due process or to
the technical requirements of state adoption law. Thus, a Korean birth
mother who has relinquished a child for adoption may not have received
the same procedural and substantive protection to which she would be
entitled in an American jurisdiction. 125
For example, while many states prescribe specific requirements for
the form and execution of a voluntary relinquishment, Korean documen-
tation is not likely to fulfill these requirements. 126  A Korean birth
mother may have relinquished the child to an orphanage without a writ-
ten relinquishment.' 27 Aside from the fact that nearly all states require a
written relinquishment, the failure to put a relinquishment in writing
may make proof of a child's availability for adoption very difficult when
the matter is presented to a state court thousands of miles away from the
child's birthplace and many months after the relinquishment. Even if the
birth mother or a subsequent guardian executed a written relinquish-
ment, the relinquishment is not likely to follow the form prescribed by
the most exacting state statutes.
Because of the frequent absence of a written parental relinquish-
ment, American adoptions of Korean children typically are premised on
& PHUONG-KHANH NGUYAN, LAWS AND POLICIES OF CERTAIN SOUTHEAST ASIAN CouNTMRES
REGARDING SENDING ORPHANS ABROAD FOR ADOPTION 7 (1975).
123. For example, in South Vietnam (before its annexation by North Vietnam), if birth parents
placed a child in an orphanage the child was often regarded as "abandoned," hence adoptable,
whether or not the birth parents signed a relinquishment. However, it appears that Vietnamese par-
ents sometimes used orphanages as temporary refuges for their children, without any intention of
relinquishing their children for adoption. See Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1197
(9th Cir. 1975); Comment, Immigration Laws, Procedures and Impediments Pertaining to Intercoun-
try Adoptions, 4 DEN. J. INT'L LAW & POLICY 257, 266-67 n.52 (1974).
124. Kim & Carroll, supra note 80.
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the relinquishment of the child's last Korean guardian. 128 However,
without an accompanying relinquishment by the birth parents or a judi-
cial decree terminating the birth parents' rights, there may be, from the
perspective of American law, a gap in the chain of guardianship. Ameri-
can law would insist on proof that a guardian obtained his authority by
virtue of a parental relinquishment or a judicial decree. In Korea, how-
ever, the right of guardianship automatically vests in whoever receives
physical custody of a child. There is no need for an express parental
relinquishment or court decree to give the power of guardianship to an
orphanage to which a birth mother has entrusted her child. Thus, while
there may be a guardian's relinquishment for a child, there will be no
evidence (satisfying American standards) that the guardian lawfully ac-
quired the power to place the child. 29
Even more difficult problems arise with respect to children who are
refugees from areas reduced by war to near anarchy, or from nations
with whom United States relations are unfriendly. Documenting the ori-
gin of child refugees after World War II was often difficult,1 30 but later
wars in Third World countries have created even greater complications.
During the mass exodus of refugees from Vietnam after the fall of Saigon
in 1975, many children were orphaned or abandoned and then trans-
ported to the United States under circumstances that made it impossible
to reconstruct a child's origin or adoptability. After thousands of
Vietnamese "orphans" were flown to Western nations in the "babylift,"
it was discovered that many of the children were not orphans at all, but
had been left at orphanages on a temporary basis by living parents. 31
The nonexistence of written relinquishments or other records, the chaotic
conditions under which the children were placed on planes, and the acri-
monious relations between the United States and the Hanoi government
made it extremely difficult to sort out the history and status of each
child. 13
2
Vietnamese children who were part of the "boat people" refugees
after the fall of Saigon experienced similar difficulties. In some cases,
desperate parents entrusted children to escaping friends or relatives with-
out any official action in the hope that the child would arrive safely in the
128. Id.
129. Id at 226-30.
130. See Samuels, They Call it 'Home" N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1949, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, col. 3.
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United States. 3 ' Even when the parents intended to accompany their
children in the escape, confusion or panic sometimes caused families to
be separated onto different boats. Some parents purposely scattered the
family onto several boats to increase the probability that some members
safely would reach refugee camps.13 4 When very young children arrived
in refugee camps unaccompanied by parents, the reason and purpose of
their separation from parents was often uncertain. Determining whether
their parents were still living in Vietnam was especially difficult because
of political conditions in that country. A letter to a Vietnamese friend or
relative still living in Vietnam would be certain to alert local authorities
that the addressee was associated with an emigre, and might even raise
suspicion of a conspiracy.
1 35
In some cases, a child is not only relinquished under foreign law but
is also adopted under foreign law in a foreign judicial proceeding. 136
However, adoption overseas does not necessarily avoid the difficulty of
obtaining a state court's acceptance of a foreign relinquishment. It is
prudent, if not absolutely necessary, to readopt a child under state law
after the child's immigration.' 37 The readoption proceeding before a
state court may require a reexamination of the circumstances and valid-
ity of the child's adoptabilty.138 In that event, the incompatability of a
foreign relinquishment process and state adoption law may be as serious
an issue as in the case of a child who is being adopted for the first time.
In sum, the character and form of a child's foreign relinquishment
for adoption may be of infinite variety and of little or no formality or
documentation, in contrast with the relatively standardized, carefully
documented, and judicially supervised relinquishments commonly re-
quired under American law. Even if the relinqishment of the foreign-
born child's last guardian fulfills the requirements of state law, it may
suffer from a gap in the chain of guardianship. Whether a strict state
adoption law is fully able to cope with the vagaries of a foreign relin-
quishment may depend largely on whether the law includes a special en-
abling provision for transnational adoptions. Some states have ignored
133. Pask & Jayne, Refugee Camps and Legal Problems: Vietnamese Refugee Children, 22 J.
FAM. L. 537, 539-40 (1984).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 545.
136. This practice was typical under the post-war refugee relief laws when many European chil-
dren were adopted by American citizens stationed abroad. Adoption overseas is also common in the
transnational adoption of Latin American children because of national laws requiring adoption in a
local court before a child's emigration. Comment, supra note 123, at 257, 261.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 262.
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the problem, others have taken a variety of approaches in recognizing
and dealing with foreign relinquishments. The state process of adoption
will be considered more fully below, but first the intermediate stage, fed-
eral approval of immigration for purposes of adoption, must be explored.
B. The Immigration Process
After the foreign relinquishment of a child for adoption, and before
the issuance of a state court order of adoption, federal immigration offi-
cials must grant the child admission to the United States as an immigrant
for the purpose of adoption.139 Federal officials have no authority to
grant an adoption, but in granting admission to a child they must make
an administrative determination that the child can be adopted and that
the petitioners for the child's admission are qualified to be adoptive par-
ents." In making such determinations, federal officials duplicate deter-
minations that later must be made by a state court in the adoption
proceeding, but the only necessary consequence of a favorable decision
by federal immigration officials is that the child is eligible to immigrate to
the United States."'
1. Methods of Approval
Under the current orphan provisions of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, there are three principal paths by which an adoptable child
may be approved for immigration. 42 The first and most often used
method is available for petitioners who have recently adopted a child
overseas, or who intend to adopt the child after the child's immigra-
tion. 143 The adoptive or prospective adoptive parents petition to have the
child declared an "immediate relative" pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101(b)(1)(F).'" If the child qualifies as an "orphan,"
and if the petitioners have fulfilled certain other requirements, the child
will be classified as an immediate relative exempt from the numerical
limitations applicable to most other immigrants.'45
A second method is available primarily for adoptive parents who
have resided overseas for an extended period of time during which they
139. Id.
140. Id. at 262-63.
141. Id.
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
143. Id.
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adopted a foreign born child in a foreign proceeding. 146 When the par-
ents return to the United States and seek to bring their child with them,
they may petition to have the child declared an "immediate relative"
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b)(1)(E). 147
Subparagraph (E) is less used than subparagraph (F), because it is appli-
cable only to a child who has already been adopted and who has been in
the legal custody of and who has resided with an adoptive parent for at
least two years.' 48 Apart from the two year legal custody and residence
requirement which renders Subparagraph (E) unavailable for most adop-
tive or prospective adoptive parents, the provision is procedurally less
demanding than Subparagraph (F). 14 9
A third method for transnational adoption involves the Attorney
General's exercise of his discretionary parole authority under the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.' 50 In an emergency situation, the Attorney
General may admit alien parolees who would not otherwise have quali-
fied for admission or who must be admitted immediately for extraordi-
nary reasons.' 5 ' However, the parole status is only temporary.




150. For example, it is necessary for the petitioners to prove that the immigrant child was an
"orphan" before the adoption, that they can satisfy state preadoption requirements, or that they
have received a favorable recommendation in a formal home study. Moreover, the Subparagraph
(E) avenue is available to lawful permanent resident aliens, whereas Subparagraph (F) is available
only to United States citizens.
Another rarely employed method is to seek a "nonpreference" visa, which is subject to numeri-
cal limitations. Under a former two petitions per family limit, some families that had already
adopted two immigrant children followed the nonpreference route to adopt a third immigrant child.
See Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, passim. Today, because of the long waiting periods for
nonpreference visas, the usefulness of this method is very limited. Comment, supra note 123, at 264,
272-73; Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 15 (Statement of Rep. B.F. Sisk). There is some risk
that parents could use the nonpreference route to circumvent the requirements that the adoptee be
an "orphan" and that the parents have obtained a favorable home study. However, as a matter of
practice, immigration officials have reviewed the suitability of prospective parents using the non-
preference route under provisions granting immigration officials the authority to exclude a person
(i.e., the child) who is likely to become a public charge. Id. at 30.
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982). It is the policy of the Service not to rely on the parole provi-
sion in routine transnational adoption cases. Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5. The parole
power has been exercised on a large scale with respect to alien orphans on two occasions. First,
several hundred Korean orphans were paroled in 1957 when the number of nonquota visas for that
year was exhausted. Second, hundreds of orphans carried from Vietnam in the "babylift" operations
were paroled because of the imminent collapse of the South Vietnamese government. See Nguyen
Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975).
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Eventually it becomes necessary to seek an adjustment of an orphan pa-
rolee's status from parolee to permanent resident.1 52 For an orphan pa-
rolee, eligibility for an adjustment in status would be based on the same
standards that are used in the classification of a prospective adoptive
child as an immediate relative under Section 1 101(b)(1). 153
Whether an adoptive or prospective adoptive child enters the United
States as a parolee on an emergency basis, or as an immigrant "immedi-
ate relative," the orphan provisions of the immigration laws accord such
a child a high priority among immigrants. 154 Special treatment is neces-
sary for such children because delays that are commonly experienced by
other immigrants might make transnational adoption impractical. For
parents seeking to adopt an infant, a delay of more than several months
might negate one of their primary aims. If the child is in a region of war,
civil disorder, or extreme poverty, a delay of several months might be
risky to child's well-being. For children placed with adoptive parents
overseas, delayed immigration and possible separation from the adoptive
family may be a great emotional hardship.
Adoptive or prospective adoptive children enjoy certain advantages
over other immigrants. The immigration laws eliminate one major cause
of delay, the wait for a numerically restricted visa, by categorizing adop-
tive and prospective adoptive children as "immediate relatives" of United
States citizens or residents, thereby circumventing numerical restrictions
applicable to other immigrants.' 5 In addition, the Service has developed
expedited procedures for the processing of immigration petitions for
adoptive or prospective adoptive children. 56 For example, the petition-
ing prospective parents for a child immigrant may file the petition and
the Service may begin to process the petition even before a child has been
selected or matched with the parents." 7 In this way, preliminary mat-
ters such as the qualifications of the petitioners can be determined in
152. A petition to have the child classified as an immediate relative would be inappropriate,
because such a petition may be entertained only with respect to a person not yet admitted to the
United States. See In re Handley, 17 I.&N. Dec. 269 (Reg. Com. 1978); DEPT. OF JUSTICE IMMI-
ORATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, § 204.3(d).
153. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(b)(2). See generally Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir.
1975).
154. Id.
155. Strickler, Adopted and Prospective Adoptive Children, 30 INS REP. 8 (Spring, 1982).
156. Id.; U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, THE IMMI-
GRATION OF ADOPTED AND PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE CHILDREN 21-22 (1984); U.S. DEPT. OF JUS-
TICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS § 204.3.
157. Strickler, supra note 155.
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advance while they or their agency are locating a child. Also bureau-
cratic entanglements are more easily resolved for such children because
the petitioning prospective parents, who are most often United States cit-
izens and voters, can seek and are likely to obtain the intervention of
sympathetic Congressmen.
2. Convergence of Federal and State Law
Federal policy favoring the expedited immigration of adoptive and
prospective adoptive children is undoubtedly a constitutional prerogative
of the federal government. The federal government exercises plenary and
exclusive authority to regulate the admission of aliens into the United
States.158 However, when federal officials grant admission to an adoptive
or prospective adoptive child, they are not only exercising traditional fed-
eral authority over immigration, they are also making judgments that
bear a strong resemblance to state family court decrees. If the child is to
be admitted, there must be a determination that the child is adoptable
and will be adopted if not already lawfully adopted. To make such find-
ings, federal officials must necessarily range into the territory of parent-
child relations; it is here that federal immigration policy overlaps with
both foreign and state law.
a. Qualification of Adoptive Parents
In the usual case, immigration officials first determine whether the
petitioners are qualified to adopt, even before any particular child has
been identified as the beneficiary of the petition.159 The determination of
whether the petitioners are qualified involves a mixture of federal and
state law. First, federal officials must determine the petitioners' qualifica-
tions under state law, and must predict that a state court would approve
the petitioners as adoptive parents. 60 Naturally, this prediction must
take account of the law of the state in which the petitioners will seek to
adopt. To this extent, the fcderal standard for adoptive parents relies on
158. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659
(1892); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964-66 (11th Cir. 1984).
159. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2 (1982).
160. The federal interest in determining whether the petitioners are qualified to be adoptive par-
ents involves an excursion into family law that is unusual for the federal government, but can be
justified on practical grounds. The purpose of the orphan immigrant provisions is to permit a child
to immigrate for the purpose of adoption, but this purpose would be frustrated if the petitioners were
unable to obtain an adoption decree by a state court. If the adoption fails, agency or local goven-
ment officials would place the child with new applicants. The child's immigration would not be for
nought, but the wasted time and resulting delay in the child's placement in a permanent family
environment could be detrimental to the child's well-being.
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state law. Federal immigration law requires the petitioners to show that
they have satisfied the "preadoption" requirements of state law. 16 1 Im-
migration officials work closely with state officials to ensure complete and
correct application of state requirements.1
6 2
Most state adoption laws also direct a court to consider subjective
qualifications of prospective adoptive parents, such as financial, physical,
mental, and moral suitability. For some petitioners, a prediction of suc-
cess based on these criteria would be speculative. As a practical matter,
however, the eligibility of the petitioners will be determined by the state's
own process before federal officials act on the immigration petition. State
adoption laws generally require a professional home study of the pro-
spective parents as a preadoption requirement. Consequently, in order to
prove compliance with all state preadoption requirements, the petitioners
must provide federal officials with a favorable home study by a state li-
censed social worker. If state law does not provide for a professional
home study, federal immigration law independently requires a favorable
home study. 163  Although a home study is not necessarily binding on
state courts, they routinely accept the recommendations of professional
home studies. 16' A reexamination of the prospective parents' qualifica-
tions by a court is likely only when new and troubling background evi-
dence has come to light or when the prospective parents and child have
not adapted well during a trial custody period.
While the importance of predicting the success of state adoption
proceedings would certainly justify federal application of state parental
qualifications, immigration law does not stop at incorporating state pa-
rental qualifications; it also establishes separatefederal standards of eligi-
bility. For example, regardless of state marital or age requirements,
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(1)(F)(1982). See generally Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 66.
Immigration officials may require a petitioner to provide a statement from a state welfare depart-
ment setting out requirements for adoption in the state. Id. at 35, 42, 61-63; Article, supra note 87, at
248. Immigration officials also obtain a report from the appropriate state welfare department re-
garding the qualifications of the prospective adoptive parents under state law. Alien AdoptedChil-
dren, supra note 5, at 58-59. If the child already has been adopted overseas and has lived with the
adoptive parents for two years, it is unnecessary, for purposes of immigration law, to establish that
preadoption requirements are satisfied. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(1)(E) (1982). However, if the petitioners
are not qualified to adopt under state law, a question may arise as to whether it is possible for the
petitioners to "readopt" the child to obtain all the benefits of an adoption under state law.
162. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(f) (1987).
163. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(d) (1982). A home study is not required by federal law if the child was
adopted overseas and has lived with the adoptive parents for two years before the child's immigra-
tion, but a state court may demand a home study if the petitioners attempt to "readopt" the child to
obtain all the benefits of an adoption under state law.
164. See R. SIMON & H. ALSTEIm, supra note 29, at 17-18.
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federal law requires that single prospective adoptive parents must be at
least twenty-five years of age. 6 5 Federal law also authorizes immigration
officials to decide for themselves the financial, mental, and moral suitabil-
ity of the petitioners by requiring that immigration officials be satisfied
that "proper care will be furnished the child if admitted to the United
States." '166 Federal officials generally accept the home study recommen-
dations of state licensed social workers, but they could disagree and re-
ject a petition by prospective parents otherwise qualified under state
law. 167 The provision for an independent federal review of the petition-
ers' suitability as parents appears to be an extension of the long standing
immigration policy that aliens who are likely to become public charges
should be excluded from the United States.
1 68
b. Adoptability of Child
If the petitioners are deemed to be qualified, immigration officials
must also determine the adoptability of the child named in the petition.
The issue of adoptability is usually more difficult and is the most frequent
reason for the denial of a petition.1 69 Again, the adoptability issue re-
quires federal officials to make a decision that traditionally has been
within the province of state courts. In contrast with the issue of parental
qualifications, however, the issue of adoptability is decided under a
purely federal standard for purposes of immigration law. Immigration
officials do not predict whether a child will be regarded as adoptable
under state law; they determine only that the child is adoptable under the
standard of federal immigration law. In many respects, the federal stan-
dard resembles the standard of adoptability commonly found in state
adoption laws, and ideally, compliance with the federal standard would
also constitute compliance with the relevant state standard. In some re-
spects, however, the federal standard is different from most state stan-
dards. The federal definition of an adoptable child is a child under
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F) (1982).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., In re Russell, 11 I.&N. Dec. 302 (Deputy Assoc. Comm'r 1965). See generally
Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 37-38. Apparently, immigration officials rarely disapprove
parents who have a favorable state agency report. Id. at 38. H.R. REP. No. 1301, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2301, 2302.
168. In the past, the Service has required home studies for nonpreference immigrant orphans
(orphans immigrating other than as "immediate relatives"), even though there is no express statu-
tory home study requirement for such immigrants, because of a statutory exclusion for persons likely
to become public charges. Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 30; see also U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL Pt. III § 5.
169. Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 68.
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sixteen who "is an orphan because of the death or disappearance of,
abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss from, both parents, or
for whom the sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing the
proper care and has in writing irrevocably released the child for emigra-
tion and adoption ... .,170 This standard of adoptability is at once both
unusually restrictive and unusually broad.
Regarding a child whose birth parents are deceased, federal law fol-
lows state law in treating the child as adoptable. 71 As for a child whose
living birth parents have executed a voluntary relinquishment, however,
federal law may preclude immigration even if the child is adoptable
under state law. Federal law allows for the voluntary relinquishment of
a foreign child for adoption in the United States only if the child has one
living parent.172 Thus, a child with two living parents cannot be volunta-
rily relinquished to immigrate to the United States as a prospective adop-
tive child. This aspect of the standard may be a result of a presumption
by federal lawmakers that only a single parent could be justified in relin-
quishing his or her child for adoption. As a consequence, desperately
poor, two-parent families cannot voluntarily relinquish a child for adop-
tion in the United States. 173
Federal law is also more restrictive than state law with respect to
voluntary relinquishments in requiring proof that the sole parent "is in-
capable of providing the proper care" for the child.174 On the other
hand, if a child is abandoned, it is unnecessary to obtain a relinquishment
or to prove the child has but one parent who is unable to support the
child.175 Thus, the federal definition of adoptability may encourage par-
ents to abandon children under circumstances that are demeaning and
dangerous for the child. If large numbers of children were to be aban-
doned for this reason, it might become even more difficult to distinguish
truly abandoned children from those temporarily lost or separated from
parents.
The federal standard with respect to voluntarily relinquished chil-
dren is also sufficiently nonrestrictive to allow the immigration of a child
for adoption even though the child is not adoptable under state adoption
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F) (1982).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Jones, supra note 7, at 118. A child with two living birth parents may be treated as having
only one parent, a mother, if the child is illegitimate and has not acquired a stepfather. 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.2(d)(1)(i) (1987).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(1)(vi) (1987).
175. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(1)(viii) (1987).
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law. For example, with respect to the form of a relinquishment, federal
law states only that the relinquishment must be in writing and irrevoca-
ble.17 6 State laws, however, often prescribe stringent procedural safe-
guards for such a relinquishment.177 Therefore, a child's relinquishment
for emigration and adoption may comply with foreign law and may sat-
isfy the federal requirement of an irrevocable written relinquishment, and
yet the relinquishment may fail to satisfy the requirements of state law.
The federal standard is also less restrictive than state law with re-
spect to children who may be adoptable because of a termination of pa-
rental rights without a voluntary relinquishment. Under state law, birth
parents may involuntarily lose their rights over a child by order of a
court in an adoption proceeding or in a proceeding separate from and in
advance of the adoption proceeding. Proper grounds for involuntary ter-
mination of parental rights might include "abandonment" or "deser-
tion," but state laws often provide very specific definitions of these
terms. 7 A state judicial determination of abandonment or desertion
can be made only after a minimum effort to notify the birth parent of
proceedings that could lead to such a determination, only after the birth
parent has been afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceed-
ings, and only if the proceedings comport with American standards of
due process. 179 Federal immigration law and regulations, in contrast, do
not require a judicial decree of abandonment. If a foreign court has not
terminated the rights of the birth parents, immigration officials may con-
duct their own investigation and make their own determination of aban-
donment. While this determination may be reasonably well supported, it
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F) (1982).
177. State law may require that the relinquishment must be in writing and in a prescribed form,
that it must be executed under circumstances conducive to a knowing, intelligent and uncoerced
decision of the birth parent, and that it must provide for at least a brief period of revocability. In
some states the relinquishment must be executed before a court.
178. Many state statutes provide that a presumption that a child has been "abandoned" does not
arise until the passage of a stated period of time. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-202(7) (Supp.
1985) (rebuttable presumption of abandonment arises when parent has failed to support or maintain
regular contact with a child without just cause for one year); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1101(1)
(1974) (abandonment occurs when parent has not provided regular and reasonable financial support
and has not initiated substantial contacts for period of six months or for period of ninety days in the
case of a newborn infant).
179. See, eg., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-36 (1978), providing for certain time periods of separa-
tion or abandonment serving as basis for "implied consent or relinquishment," but "[a] court shall
not imply consent or relinquishment under this section unless the parents... have been served with
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will not necessarily be made in accordance with state procedural or sub-
stantive requirements.""0 For example, the efforts of immigration offi-
cials to locate or communicate with the birth parents may not satisfy the
notice requirements of state law. Immigration officials may also find a
child to be abandoned without the passage of any particular length of
time,1 81 while state law generally would require or encourage a specific
waiting period for the birth parents to come forward to accept and to
fulfill their responsibilities. In some cases, the birth parents' rights will
have been terminated by foreign administrative or judicial action. If so,
it is still possible that many of the American statutory or due process
safeguards will not have been observed.
Finally, federal immigration law includes among adoptable children
those who are without their parents "because of . . . separation or
loss... ,'182 The scope of these bases of adoptability is uncertain. They
appear to be in response to a problem experienced under the refugee re-
lief acts with respect to children whose parents had disappeared in the
chaos of war and to children of eastern Europe seized by the Nazis to be
reared in Germany. 83 For some children, it was simply impossible to
reconstruct an origin.184 There are cogent reasons for regarding such
children as adoptable after some point. When reasonable efforts to re-
unify a family have failed and there is little prospect that a child's origin
can be determined or that its parents are still living, it is in the child's
best interests to begin a new family. Undoubtedly, today there are chil-
dren in the United States and abroad whose origin is similarly ob-
scured.185 Some provision for the adoption of such children is clearly
desirable. However, neither Congress nor the Service has developed any
guidelines for determining when a child lost or separated from parents
180. A routine investigation by immigration officials consists of interviewing the representatives
of a participating adoption agency and interviewing any known birth parents. Alien Adopted Chil-
dren, supra note 5, at 35. While immigration officials have the authority to conduct a more thorough
investigation, they are unlikely to do so unless they are presented with evidence of fraud. Id. at 121.
Immigration officials may be hampered in performing even a routine investigation of public records
with respect to the child because of the inadequacy of public record-keeping in some developing
countries. Id. See also FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 168, § 5.2.
181. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(1)(viii) (1987).
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(F) (1982).
183. Many of the children adopted under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 were slavic children
taken from their homes by German officials during World War II to be raised in Germany. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1949, at 8, col. 5.
184. Samuels, supra note 130.
185. More recent examples of the enormous difficulties of reconstructing the origin and family
status of war-refugee children can be found in the "babylift" of hundreds of allegedly orphaned
Vietnamese children after the fall of Saigon and in the escape of thousands of "boat people," includ-
ing children and infants, from South Vietnam.
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should be regarded as adoptable. The absence of guidelines could result
in premature placement of a child for adoption. The absence of guide-
lines could also cause immigration officials to be indecisive, and could
cause unnecessary delay in the child's placement for adoption.
Because there are no federal standards for determining whether a
child is lost or separated, there can be no assurance that a federal deter-
mination that a child is lost or separated would satisfy state law. A state
court confronted with the issue of adoptability of a "lost" child would be
expected to exercise extra caution before it terminates the rights of the
birth parents and grants an adoption. In particular, a court may inquire
whether there has been an adequate search for the parents, whether there
has been a judicial finding that family reunification is beyond reasonable
hope, and whether circumstances have reached a point at which the goal
of family reunification should be abandoned in favor of placing the child
for adoption. A state court might require a minimum waiting period, as
in the case of an alleged abandonment.
1 86
The potential for conflict between federal immigration law and state
adoption law is important because the decision of immigration officials
does not finally settle the issue of adoptability. The act of immigration
officials in finding that the petitioners are eligible to adopt and that the
prospective adoptive child is eligible for adoption accomplishes only a
necessary step for bringing the child into the United States. Immigration
officials make those findings for purposes of federal immigration law, so
that the child can be deemed an "immediate relative" and may lawfully
immigrate to the United States. The child will also ordinarily be in the
custody of the petitioners or will be placed in their custody upon his
arrival, but the child does not thereby become the lawful adoptive child
of the petitioners. The last and most important step, a final adoption
order, is controlled by a state court and is subject to state adoption law.
C. State Adoption Proceedings
1. The Adoption Process
The final step and ultimate goal in a transnational adoption is the
issuance of an adoption decree in a state court proceeding. Immigration
officials may grant the child lawful residence in the United States, but
only a state court grants an adoption decree which makes the child the
petitioners' child for all purposes under the law. Before the state court
186. See, ag., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-128(D)(2) (Supp. 1985).
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may enter the decree, however, it must decide two basic issues previously
decided by federal immigration officials: whether the petitioners are eli-
gible to adopt and whether the child is adoptable. Even though immigra-
tion officials have decided those issues in favor of the petitioners, and
have granted the child "immediate relative" status for purposes of immi-
gration, there is no guarantee that a state court will find the petitioners
eligible and the child adoptable. Immigration law places no constraints
upon the independence of a state court in granting adoptions, and a state
court may be guided by different standards - especially with respect to
adoptability.
Many immigrant children admitted to the United States under the
orphan provisions have already been adopted by American citizens under
foreign law, but a foreign adoption decree does not necessarily relieve the
family of the necessity of obtaining a state court adoption decree or of the
risk that a decree will be denied. There may be some question whether
the foreign decree of adoption would be recognized by an American
court for purposes of the descent and distribution of property, survivor's
benefits, or child support."l 7 Readoption in a state court would guaran-
tee full recognition of the adoptive family for all purposes under the
law.188 As a practical matter, a state adoption decree may also be needed
to obtain a state-issued birth certificate for the child.18 9 Finally, a state
adoption decree would fortify the adoptive family against later challenges
to the validity of the adoption.1 90 Without readoption, a foreign decree
might not be recognized in a future custody dispute, or the decree, by its
nature, may be subject to modification or abrogation pursuant to the law
under which it was issued.1 91 In contrast, a final state court decree
would not only assure recognition of the adoptive family but, under
many state laws, would become absolutely unassailable after a certain
passage of time.1 92 A state court decree would also be entitled to full
187. See, ag., Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 203 Va. 670, 127 S.E.2d 145 (1962); Taylor v. Taylor, 58
Wash. 2d 510, 364 P.2d 444 (1961). Some states have enacted statutes that would give a foreign
adoption decree the same finality as a decree issued by an American state court. See infra note 226.
Even under these statutes, a foreign decree might still be subject to attack on public policy grounds.
See infra note 227. Moreover, an adoptive family residing in a state that has enacted such a comity
statute may later move to a state without a comity statute.
188. See International Adoption, supra note 81, at 240.
189. Id.; Alien Adopted Children, supra note 5, at 10.
190. See InternationalAdoption, supra note 81, at 240.
191. Breckenridge, Non-Recognition of Foreign Abandonment Decrees in United States Adoption
Proceedings, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 137, 144 (1977).
192. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.140(b) (1983), which provides:
Subject to the disposition of an appeal, upon the expiration of one year after an adoption
decree is issued, the decree may not be questioned by any person including the petitioner,
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faith and credit in other states, an advantage not available to decrees of
foreign nations.1
93
Most adoptions are granted with no more controversy than a civil
wedding, but the stakes in an adoption proceeding can be very high. The
denial of the petition could be a great emotional and psychological blow
to the petitioners and the child. In many cases, the parties not only hope
to be an adoptive family; they are, by the end of the proceeding, a psy-
chological or de facto family because a final decision may not come until
after the petitioners and child have had many months in which to bond
as a family.
The likelihood of preadoption bonding is increased by built-in de-
lays in the adoption process. In many cases, a final decision by the court
is delayed by law or by the requirements of an adoption agency for up to
a year after the placement of the child or the filing of an adoption peti-
tion, in order that the petitioners and child will have a "trial" custody
period.1 94 The purpose of the trial period is to provide social workers
and the court an opportunity to test the compatability of the petitioners
and the child. Even though a home study will have likely been com-
pleted before the trial period begins, the trial period may reveal previ-
ously undetected flaws in the petitioners' ability to be parents to the
child. If a court granted an adoption decree without a trial period, and
the family's incompatability became apparent in the months that fol-
lowed, it would be much more difficult to terminate the adoptive parents'
custody of the child, because the adoptive parents would be entitled to all
the rights of birth parents. If, after a trial period, the court doubts that
adoption by the petitioners would be in the general best interests of the
child, it can simply deny the petition and return custody of the child to
the agency involved in the adoption. While the trial custody period pro-
vides the basis for a better evaluation of parental qualifications, it also
postpones a final determination as to other issues, such as the adoptabil-
ity of the child, because a hearing on the petition is not likely until the
in any manner upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any
required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, unless, in the
case of the adoption of a minor the petitioner has not taken custody of the minor, or, in the
case of the adoption of an adult, the adult had no knowledge of the decree within the one-
year period.
Id. Like birth parents, the adoptive parents may still be subject to state intervention to terminate
their parental rights for gross neglect or abuse.
193. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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end of the trial period. 195 Thus, during the trial period, which may last
as long as a year, the prospective adoptive family's future is uncertain,
and this uncertainty may affect the development of a healthy family
relationship. 1
96
The delayed resolution of the merits of an adoption petition may be
a problem whether the prospective child is foreign-born or American-
born. However, transnational adoption differs from adoption of an
American-born child in one important respect that compounds the risk
of a denial of the decree. The relinquishment of a foreign-born child for
adoption occurs under foreign law, and more often than not, foreign law
is in conflict with state law regarding the process by which a child is
relinquished and becomes adoptable. In many states, adoption statutes
take no cognizance of transnational adoptions. Supporting a petition for
adoption may then require reliance on complicated international law ar-
guments of questionable effectiveness. Furthermore, if facts are in dis-
pute and further evidence is needed, it may be difficult or impossible to
obtain witnesses or documents concerning the child's birth in another
nation thousands of miles away.
2. State Court Reconsideration of Adoptability
Notwithstanding the numerous questions that could arise in a state
court in a transnational adoption, the number of cases in which an issue
as to adoptability has arisen is relatively small, perhaps no more than two
percent of all transnational adoptions.197 There are several possible rea-
sons why so few transnational adoptions lead to any controversy about
adoptability.
First and foremost, transnational adoption proceedings are rarely
contested. If an issue of adoptability is to be raised, it usually must be
raised sua sponte by the court. Judges, however, are likely to find an
uncontested adoption proceeding to be a pleasurable respite from a
docket filled with divorces, custody disputes, and more serious civil and
195. A few states provide for "interlocutory decrees" in which issues such as adoptability are
decided before or at the beginning of the trial custody period. See, eg., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-226
(1987). However, an interlocutory decree generally may be revoked for any "good cause" until a
final decree is entered. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-227 (1987).
196. See infra, notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
197. Most estimates are in the one to two percent range. See, e.g., Alien Adopted Children, supra
note 5, at 63; Telephone interview with Glenn Noteboom, Director of Social Services, Holt Interna-
tional (July 2, 1987). In particular states the problem may be much more severe. For example,
courts in some parts of Texas frequently question or resist transnational adoptions. Telephone inter-
view with Donna Detjam, Los Ninos International Adoption Center, Austin, Texas (Aug. 11, 1987).
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criminal matters. Where the papers appear to be in good order and the
petition is supported by an established adoption agency, the judge is not
likely to raise controversial issues. Judges will rarely press uncontested
legal issues to challenge the legal viability of a bonded, successful adop-
tive family.
A second reason that a child's adoptability is rarely questioned in an
adoption proceeding is that state courts routinely defer to the expertise of
any licensed adoption agency or public welfare department that supports
the petition. Modem adoption law places great reliance on the judgment
of public or licensed private social workers in effecting a child's relin-
quishment for adoption, selecting suitable adoptive parents, and perform-
ing a home study. Most transnational adoptions are arranged by licensed
agencies, and in some states, an adoption must be arranged by a licensed
agency. The function of an agency is to assign a child to adoptive par-
ents, collect and review pertinent documentation about the child's adopt-
ability, and guide the adoptive parents through the immigration and
adoption process. In every state, the agency or a licensed social worker
also makes recommendations to the court concerning the qualifications
of the adoptive parents. A court may routinely presume that the agency
has covered all the bases and that there is no reason to question the ex-
pert recommendations of the agency. The agency is not necessarily a
legal expert, but a court may fail to make this distinction. Out of a habit
of deferring to the agency, the court may decline to scrutinize the peti-
tion or the law. If the agency is aware of a question whether state law
allows transnational adoption without fulfillment of all state require-
ments, it could hardly be expected to raise the issue at the risk of compli-
cating an adoption that it arranged.
Finally, in some areas petitioners are able to avoid "problem" ve-
nues and judges known for scrutinizing transnational adoptions. Agen-
cies that handle large numbers of transnational adoptions are usually
familiar with judges or venues in which trouble is most likely. Local
rules may allow the petitioners to file their petition in the county where
the agency is located, rather than where the petitioners reside. If the
petitioners reside in a "problem" jurisdiction, they may choose to file
where the agency is located even though that choice of venue results in
added cost and inconvenience.
While most transnational adoptions are not delayed or obstructed
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by issues concerning a child's adoptability, such issues may arise in sev-
eral ways. First, a birth parent may challenge the legitimacy of an al-
leged termination of parental rights, or a birth relative may object to the
adoption and claim a superior right to the child.198 Such challenges are
uncommon because the birth family, if it has a change of heart, is not
likely to possess the resources or know of the means to timely challenge
an adoption proceeding in another country. Nevertheless, such chal-
lenges have occurred, particularly by Vietnamese refugees who arrived in
the United States not long after the "babylift" immigration of their
children.1 99
Second, a court may question the relinquishment sua sponte. In
most cases, an adoption proceeding is uncontested, but a judge may scru-
tinize the petition and supporting documents in the interest of safeguard-
ing the rights of the unrepresented child and the absent birth parents. A
judge may also raise issues sua sponte in order to assure that the proposed
adoption decree will not be subject to challenge. While there are good
reasons why a judge may raise the issue of adoptability in an uncontested
case, it is also possible that some judges who raise the issue are hostile to
interracial adoptions. Some social workers involved in transnational
adoptions report that they have experienced the greatest judicial resist-
ance in conservative, rural areas where prejudice against interracial
adoption might be exected to be greatest.
Finally, the issue of a child's adoptability may arise in a collateral
proceeding long after the adoption. In a subsequent dispute over the dis-
tribution of property, competing claimants may challenge the child's sta-
tus as an adoptive child. The risk of such a challenge is greatest when
the child was adopted abroad and not readopted under American law.
Even if the child was adopted or readopted under American law, the
adoption decree may still be subject to attack in jurisdictions where the
198. See, eg., Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1976); In re McElroy's
Adoption, 522 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1024 (1975). Cf Huynh
Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978) (habeas corpus action brought by grandmother and
uncle to recover custody of child placed with American citizens for the purpose of adoption);
Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975) (class action on behalf of "babylift"
infants against the INS and others seeking order for reunification of infants with birth parents in
Vietnam). Even before the babylift, there were cases in which Vietnamese children who had not
been properly relinquished were mistakenly placed for adoption in the United States. Relief and
Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina, Part 1, Orphans and Child Welfare: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 87 (1973). See also J. ERICHSEN & H. ERICHSEN, supra note
99, at 141 (report of Colombian birth mother who regained custody of her child in a New York
court).
199. See, eg., Nguyen Da Yen, 528 F.2d 1194.
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omission of a necessary relinquishment is a jurisdictional defect that can-
not be cured by the passage of time.
If a child's adoptability becomes an issue, it is possible that the court
will conclude that there is insufficient evidence of compliance with state
law. There are a multitude of reasons why a foreign relinquisment might
not comply with state law, especially where the law is particularly rigor-
ous in its protection of birth parents. Frequently in a transnational adop-
tion, there is a relinquishment by an intermediate guardian but no
written relinquishment by a birth parent, nor any affidavit or other proof
of an unwritten parental relinquishment. Judges rarely scrutinize a
transnational adoption petition in this respect, but if the question is
raised, it may become apparent that the omission of a parental relin-
quishment under the circumstances is incompatible with state law. In
Georgia for example, adoptions of Korean-born children were routinely
approved by most courts until 1985, when a superior court judge re-
quested the State Attorney General's opinion as to the permissibility of
an adoption without the relinquishment of the birth mother or putative
father. The Attorney General issued an "unofficial opinion" that, with-
out proof of a written parental relinquishment or other safeguards of pa-
rental rights, the court was required to deny the petition.2" The
Attorney General's opinion not only made future transnational adop-
tions in Georgia doubtful, but also called into question the validity of
many transational adoptions already granted.2 °1
Even when a written relinquishment supports the petition, a court
may question whether the form of the relinquishment or the procedure
by which it was obtained complies with state law. While some states
require judicial supervision of a parental relinquishment, it is unlikely
that a foreign relinquishment will have been executed before a court.
The foreign reinquishment may fail to reflect that it was obtained after
birth or that it was revocable for any length of time. The relinquishment
also may omit the cautionary language that state law requires to be in-
serted in the relinquishment.
If the petition alleges that the child is abandoned by or lost from the
birth parents, and that a parental relinquishment is unnecessary, the
court may disagree that there is sufficient proof, or that there has been a
sufficient investigation of the child's origin and status. Indeed, the court
200. 85 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-34 (Aug. 27, 1985) (Ga. unofficial opinion)
201. The Georgia legislature subsequently amended its adoption law in GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
416 (Supp. 1987) to provide that a foreign-born child should be deemed adoptable if it has been
relinquished by its foreign guardian.
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may be presented with no evidence other than the determination of the
Service that the child is lost or abandoned and has been relinquished by
the child's foreign guardian. The notice requirements or the waiting pe-
riod prescribed by state law for abandoned children will not necessarily
have been observed by immigration officials.
3. Arguments Against Reconsideration of Adoptability
a. The Act of State Doctrine
When a court does question a child's adoptability, and state adop-
tion law lacks special provisions to facilitate transnational adoption, the
petitioners may raise a number of arguments against reexamination of
the Service's or foreign court's determination that the child is adoptable.
One possible argument is based on the act of state doctrine. That doc-
trine requires a court to "refrain from examining the validity of an act of
a foreign state by which that state has exercised its jurisdiction to give
effect to its public interests.""2 2 The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent
a court from taking actions that might interfere with the federal execu-
tive branch in its foreign relations.20 3 The doctrine is frequently invoked
to prevent an American court from questioning the validity of a foreign
government's expropriation of property located within that government's
territory.2" In at least one case, In re McElroy's Adoption,2 °5 the peti-
tioners in a transnational adoption invoked the doctrine in an attempt to
prevent a Tennessee court's reexamination of a child's adoptability.
However, as McElroy illustrates, the act of state doctrine is of limited
usefulness in the context of a transnational adoption.
The prospective adoptive child in McElroy was the birth daughter of
an unmarried Korean woman and an American serviceman who had
lived together during the serviceman's assignment in Korea.20 6 The fa-
ther was reassigned to the United States before the child was born, but
when the child was about eight months old, the father returned to Korea
to marry the mother and legitimatize his daughter.2"7 He married the
mother and obtained an American passport for his daughter, but because
of a delay in the issuance of a passport for his new wife he was forced to
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41
(1965).
203. Id. at comment c.
204. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
205. 522 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1024 (1975).
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return alone to the United States, where he awaited the arrival of the rest
of his family.2"'
His wife soon lost interest in going to the United States. She appar-
ently abandoned her daughter and then disappeared without a trace.2 °9
The father did not learn of this unfortunate turn of events until several
months later, when acquaintances in Korea informed him that his
daughter was about to be placed for adoption.21 0 Before the father could
arrange for his daughter's transportation to the United States, a Korean
orphanage relinquished the child to an American adoption agency,
which placed the child with a prospective adoptive family in Chatta-
nooga, Tennessee.211 With the assistance of the United States Depart-
ment of State, the father finally located his daughter and intervened in
the adoption preceeding.21 2 The trial court denied the petition for adop-
tion on the grounds that the father's parental rights had not been prop-
erly terminated, and it awarded the father custody of his daughter.213
On appeal, the petitioners argued that the act of state doctrine pre-
cluded the court's questioning of the child's adoptability, because munic-
ipal authorities of Seoul, Korea had determined that the child was
suitable for adoption.214 The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court and tersely rejected the act of state argument.215 The court
asserted that the doctrine was applicable only to actions of a "sovereign
nation" and not to the actions of a political subdivision of a nation.216
Since the decision that the child was suitable for adoption was made by
municipal authorities of the city of Seoul, rather than the central govern-
ment of Korea, there was no "act of state," and the trial court was free to
decide for itself the child's adoptability.21
The court's invocation of a "subdivision" exception to the act of
state doctrine has been severely critized elsewhere,21 8 but there are other
reasons why the act of state doctrine should not have been applied in
McElroy and why the doctrine would be of little or no usefulness in a
transnational adoption proceeding. First, the McElroy court was nearly
208. Id. at 346-47.
209. Id. at 347.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 348.
213. Id.




218. See Breckenridge, supra note 191.
1988]
43
Carlson: Transnational Adoption of Children
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
correct in stating that the doctrine does not preclude review of "subdivi-
sions" of nations. It is generally accepted that the doctrine does not ap-
ply to acts of all foreign officials or institutions.219 For example, courts
applying the doctrine have usually drawn a line at executive, administra-
tive, and legislative acts, excluding judicial acts.220 The reasoning behind
this distinction is that a judicial act is seldom an act of a sovereign state
in its own public interests. Instead it is more likely to involve a resolu-
tion of competing interests of private litigants.221
In nations with a lesser tradition of separation of powers, this sort of
line-drawing can be especially difficult. In some nations, the process by
which a child is made available for adoption may resemble administra-
tive or executive action because of the involvement of executive or ad-
ministrative officials.2 22 However, as a fact finding process leading to the
adjustment of individual status, the process by which a child becomes
adoptable is better characterized as judicial, regardless of the official title
or position of the decision maker. Thus, the act of state doctrine would
not necessarily be applicable to a foreign state's termination of parental
rights or to a foreign state's adoption decree. Of course, the doctrine
certainly would not require recognition of a "private" relinquishment not
given force by any government act.
There are other equally forceful arguments against application of
the act of state doctrine in a transnational adoption. For example, appli-
cation of the doctrine presumes that, under principles of choice of law,
the foreign state's law would normally govern the matter.223 However, it
is not at all certain that foreign law still governs the adoptability of a
child after the child has become a United States resident.2 24
b. Comity
Another argument that has been raised against a state court's reex-
amination of a child's adoptability is that a foreign decree freeing the
child for adoption should be accepted by an American court as a matter
219. See, e.g., id. at 142.
220. Id. at 143; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 41 comment d (1965); Kim & Carroll, supra note 80, at 244-46.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41
comment d (1965).
222. Kim & Carroll, supra note 80, at 244-46.
223. Breckenridge, supra note 191, at 144-45.
224. See supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23:317
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of comity. 22 5 Some state adoption codes even include a statutory provi-
sion for the recognition of foreign adoption decrees as a matter of com-
ity.226 The doctrine of comity, however, is a partial solution at best.
Under both the common law and most statutory versions of the doctrine,
a state court is required to accept a foreign decree as a matter of comity
unless the foreign proceeding was inconsistent with basic American no-
tions of fairness or with the public policies of the forum American
state.227 Yet many of the objections that might be raised against a for-
eign decree of adoptability do involve notions of fairness and public pol-
icy. Many states view their requirements for a parental relinquishment
to be an important matter of public policy; therefore the omission of a
relinquishment would be unacceptable. 228 A state court may also insist
that basic fairness requires proof of attempted notice to birth parents in
the case of an "abandoned" or "lost" child.229 For transnational adop-
tion in which no foreign decree of adoption or termination of parental
rights exists, the doctrine of comity is of no use.
225. See, eg., Corbett v. Stergios, 257 Iowa 1387, 137 N.W.2d 266 (1965); National City Bank of
Cleveland v. Judkins, 8 Ohio Misc. 119, 219 N.E.2d 456 (1964); Doulgeris v. Bambacus, 203 Va.
670, 127 S.E.2d 145 (1962).
226. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.160 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-9-218 (1987); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-4-107.5 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.192 (West 1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-
16 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-10 (Burns 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.15 (West 1981);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.170 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-128 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 170-B:24 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-17; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.20 (West
1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.385 (1987); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2908 (Purdon Supp. 1987);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 435(9) (Supp. 1987).
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 9
comment a (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 90, 98, 290 comment c
(1969). See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.192 (West 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.15 (West 1981);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453-170 (Vernon 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-13:24 (1977); see also
Doulgeris, 203 Va. 670, 127 S.E.2d 145 (1962).
228. See, e.g., 85 Op. Att'y Gen No. U85-34 (Aug. 27, 1985) (Ga. unofficial opinion); Doulgeris
v. Bambacus, 203 Va. 670, 127 S.E.2d 145 (1962). In Doulgeris, an adoptive sister claimed an inter-
est in the estate of her deceased adoptive brother based on an adoption decree issued by a Greek
court. 127 S.E.2d at 147. The Virginia court held that the Greek adoption decree should not be
recognized for purposes of Virginia property law. Id. at 150. Under Greek law, a child was adopta-
ble if relinquished by the father, even without the consent of the mother. Id. at 147. There was no
evidence of the birth mother's consent in the Dougleris case, but Virginia law insisted upon such
consent. Id. at 149. The court concluded that it would be contrary to the public policy of Virginia
to recognize the adoption decree. Id.
Under current immigration laws, an adoptive or prospective adoptive child cannot immigrate as
an immediate relative without the consent of a living birth mother unless the child is admitted
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(1)(E) (1982), which requires that the child has been in the custody of
the petitioners for at least two years. However, an adoptive child can immigrate as an immediate
relative without any notice to or consent by a putative father. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(d)(1) (1987). See
also In re McElroy's Adoption, 522 S.W.2d 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1024
(1975).
229. See, eg., 85 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-34 (Aug. 27, 1985) (Ga. unofficial opinion).
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c. Choice of Law Principles and the Child's Best Interests
With or without a foreign decree of adoption or adoptability, it
might be argued that the validity of a child's relinquishment for adoption
should be governed by the law of the nation in which the relinquishment
occurred. The applicable choice of law principles, however, are ambigu-
ous with respect to transnational adoptions.23 ° The few international
treaties and conventions that address the matter are unclear and, in any
event, are not binding on the United States.23' Under generally accepted
American rules of choice of law, a court is to apply the law of the forum
state in determining whether to grant an adoption.232 This rule appears
to be designed primarily with interstate adoptions in mind,2 3 but the few
courts that have considered the question have also applied this rule in
transnational adoptions and have tested the validity of relinquishment
(or omission of a relinquishment) under American law.234 A state
court's concern over an immigrant child's adoptability is not necessarily
misplaced. The child is a domiciliary of the state at the time of the adop-
tion proceeding, and the state has a keen interest in the child's welfare.
Nevertheless, the traditional rule applied in interstate adoptions may be
out of place in a transnational adoption, where the burden of satisfying
local law may be much greater.
Putting to one side the traditional rule for interstate adoptions but
retaining due regard for the special characteristics of transnational adop-
tions, the formative principles of choice of law may provide a basis for
the strongest argument against a state court's reexamination of a foreign
born child's adoptability. Factors so often considered in developing
choice of law rules, such as the needs of the international system, the
interests of the nation from which the child emigrated, the protection of
230. See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629-30 (6th Cir. 1978).
231. See, eg., Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the Adoption of Mi-
nors, May 24, 1984, Art. 3, 24 I.L.M. 460; Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and
Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions, Oct. 28, 1964, arts. 3,4,5, 4 I.L.M. 338. Each of
these conventions provides that issues relating to a child's adoptability are to be determined by the
law of the child's nationality or "habitual residence." This rule could be interpreted to support the
application of United States law, because a state court does not decide whether to grant an adoption
until the child has immigrated and become a resident of the United States. See Levi, 586 F.2d at
629-30.
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 289 (1969).
233, See, eg., id. comments.
234. See, e.g., 85 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-34 (Aug. 27, 1985) (Ga. unofficial opinion); Levi, 586
F.2d 625; Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Iowa 1976).
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the parties, the justified expectations, and the need for certainty, predict-
ability and uniformity of result,235 would support a rule that adoptability
is determined by the law of the child's origin. As a practical matter, the
validity of a relinquishment is best governed by the law of the nation in
which the relinquishment was granted. Persons involved in effecting the
relinquishment may have little understanding of American law, and may
not even know what state or nation will become the child's future home.
At the time parental rights are terminated, the nation in which the termi-
nation occurs is still exclusively responsible for the child's welfare and
for the security and integrity of the child's birth family. That nation may
be pursuing an important social policy by promoting or allowing emigra-
tion of adoptable children who cannot otherwise be supported or placed.
The nation or state to which the child immigrates does not become
responsible for the child's welfare until the child arrives. While that state
may still have some interest in the circumstances under which the child
came to be available for adoption, relinquishment rules are not the only
means a court has of satisfying that interest. A court may also grant or
refuse a petition for adoption on the basis of a more general standard:
the child's "best interests." '236 Limiting a state court's inquiry to determ-
ing a child's "best interests" could prevent the court's insistence on com-
pliance with state law in a routine, uncontested case, but would still leave
an opening for consideration of the fairness of a child's relinquishment in
a rare contested case.
Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson237 illustrates the relationship be-
tween a child's best interests and the fairness of a foreign termination of a
birth parent's rights. The plaintiff was a Vietnamese widow and mother
who had taken her seven children to an American run orphanage during
the last days before the collapse of the Saigon government. 38 She took
the children to the orphanage because she believed they would be killed
by the Communists, and she left instructions that the children were to be
taken out of the country.239 According to her subsequent testimony, she
did not consent to the adoption of her children, and she positively re-
fused to sign a relinquishment for their adoption.2" Before she left the
orphanage, she obtained the organization's American address so that she
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969); Kim & Carroll, supra
note 80, at 239.
236. See, eg., Doan Thi Hoang Anh, 245 N.W.2d at 517.






Carlson: Transnational Adoption of Children
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
would be able to retrieve her children if she was able to escape to the
United States.241 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff did escape with other
"boat people" aboard a fishing vessel.2 42 When she arrived in the United
States, she immediately contacted the Red Cross for assistance in track-
ing down her children, who by then had been separated into four differ-
ent homes.243 The plaintiff succeeded in locating all seven children, but
the prospective adoptive parents of one child had grown very attached to
the child and refused vountarily to relinquish custody. 44 The plaintiff
then brought a habeas corpus proceeding against the prospective adop-
tive parents and succeeded in regaining custody. 45
Neither party in Doan Thi Hoang Anh argued in favor of application
of Vietnamese law, and therefore, no choice of law problem was
presented. The court applied Iowa law and held that the child was not
adoptable because the birth mother had not executed a relinquishment in
compliance with statutorily prescribed procedures.246 The defendants ar-
gued that they should be allowed to retain custody notwithstanding the
omission of a relinquishment, because the child's best interests would be
violated by his removal from the family with which he had lived and
bonded for many months.2 47 The court agreed that the child's best inter-
ests were relevant,2 48 but it turned the best interests argument against the
defendants. The court began with a presumption that a child's best inter-
ests are with his birth mother.249 The circumstances of the plaintiff's
alleged relinquishment did not rebut this presumption. Instead, the rec-
ord showed the birth mother "to be a woman of extraordinary... perse-
verance and full compassion for her child."2 0 The court considered that
the child had lived with the defendants for four months when the plain-
tiff arrived in the United States and began to relocate her children, but it
found that four months was not substantial "in this instance."2 51




244. Id. at 514.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 516-18.
247. Id. at 517-18.
248. Id. at 517.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 518. The court also considered evidence that the child had begun "rejecting his
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that the child was relinquished for adoption under Vietnamese law, the
proper result would still have been the same. Regardless of whether
there has been a valid relinquishment and termination of parental rights,
a court must still decide the more general question whether a child's best
interests favor adoption.2"2 When a birth mother contests the adoption
and seeks custody, the circumstances of her relinquishment of the child
may be relevant to the question of the child's best interests. In Doan Thi
Hoang Anh, in view of the circumstances of the relinquishment, the
mother's effort to regain custody, and the court's finding that the child
had not resided with the prospective adoptive family for a substantial
period of time, it was in the child's best interests to be returned to his
birth mother.
d. The Child's Best Interests Preempting Review of Adoptability
It has been argued, as it was by the prospective adoptive parents in
Doan Thi Hoang Anh, that the "best interests" doctine should preclude a
state court's reexamination of a foreign relinquishment or termination of
parental rights, because the court is not likely to address the issue of
adoptability until after the petitioners and child have become a psycho-
logical family.253 This argument has much appeal in a routine, uncon-
tested case, but it suffers from two limitations. First, a court has no
reason or authority to decide a child's "best interests" unless it has some
reason to find that the birth parents' rights are, or ought to be, termi-
nated.25 4 If the birth parent has not relinquished the child, and is not
shown to be unfit or incapable, a court cannot reach the best interests
question, for it lacks any power to grant an adoption of a child who is not
adoptable.2 5 Adoption law has subordinated the "best interests" of the
child to protection of the family as an institution. A child's best interests
presumptively are with his birth family, unless there are compelling
252. See, ag., Kim & Carroll, supra note 80, at 243.
253. See id. The authors argue as follows:
In the overall proceeding the court is faced with a simple choice. That choice is between
selecting as parents for the child either a couple who has gone to great emotional and
economic expense in their desire to provide a home for the child, or a person who has
previously demonstrated his lack of interest in the child by abandoning it. On public policy
grounds the best interests of the child should be found with the adoptive couple.
Id. Cf In re Juan P.H.C., 130 Misc.2d 387, 496 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1985) (granting
preadoption certificate for El Salvadoran child despite evidence of illegal baby marketing scheme,
where the "petitioner sincerely views the particular child ... as one already having a kinship to
her").
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grounds for terminating parental rights of the birth parents.256 Thus,
raising the "best interests" argument will not necessarily divert the court
from questioning the child's adoptability.
The other limitation of the "bests interests" argument against state
court reexamination of adoptability, is that consideration of a child's best
interest may require inquiry into the circumstances of the child's relin-
quishment, at least in a contested case such as in Doan Thi Hoang Anh.
As noted earlier, any gross unfairness in a relinquishment or termination
of parental rights may be relevant to a determintion of a child's best in-
terests. A court must then balance its concern for the integrity of the
birth family against the trauma the child would experience if he were
separated from his prospective adoptive family.
4. State Statutes Facilitating Transnational Adoption
Each of the doctrinal arguments against reexamination of a child's
adoptability has one fault: none contributes to the development of a sim-
ple process with predictable results. If a court rejects the act of state
doctrine, rejects comity, and rejects the applicability of foreign law, the
court has no option but to examine the issue independently, and it may
find the child unadoptable under local law. Even if the court is per-
suaded to recognize the foreign relinquishment under one of the doc-
trines, it may still require persuasive proof of the substance of foreign law
or of compliance with foreign law and fundamental fairness. Proof of
foreign law and the factual circumstances of the relinquishment may
then be an unexpected and substantial burden to the prospective parents.
If the court ultimately grants the adoption, the petitioners will still have
experienced delay, expense, and uncertainty in a preferably routine
ceremony.
Statutes which preclude reexamination of adoptability are one way
of settling the adoptability issue quickly and with less risk of controversy.
Such statutes recognize that federal immigration officials or foreign offi-
cials are in the best position to determine a child's adoptability, and to a
varying extent, the statutes remove that issue from a state court's domain
in a transnational adoption. Transnational adoption statutes achieve this
effect in several different ways. One statutory approach validates any
256. Doan Thi Hoang Anh v. Nelson, 245 N.W.2d 511, 517-18 (Iowa 1976). The court in Doan
Thi Hoang Anh characterized the best interests issue as "dispositive." Id. at 517. However, that
case was not an adoption proceeding but a habeas corpus proceeding in which only the custody of a
child was at stake. One factor bearing on the best interests of the child was that, absent a lawful
relinquishment, the prospective adoptive parents would not be able to adopt the child. Id.
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foreign relinquishment or termination of parental rights approved by im-
migration officials. Illustrative of this approach is a New Jersey statute
which states as follows: "[i]f the United States Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service has determined that the child has been approved for
adoptive placement, that finding shall be presumptive and no notice as to
the availability of the child for adoption shall be served." '257 Similar stat-
utes have been enacted by Ohio,258 Colorado,259 and New York. 60 The
New York statute adopts the federal standard of adoptability for most
transnational adoptions, but reserves to the state courts the authority to
decide whether that standard has been satisfied. 61
An alternative method of simplifying transnational adoptions pro-
vides that the validity of a relinquishment or termination of parental
rights should be governed by the law of the country in which it was
granted. A Connecticut statute follows this approach:
A minor child shall be considered free for adoption... if any of the
following have occurred: . . . (d)(1) in the case of any child from
outside the United States, its territories or the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico placed for adoption by the commissioner of children and
youth services or by any child-placing agency, the petitioner has filed
an affidavit that the child has no living parents or that the child is free
for adoption and that the rights of all parties in connection with the
child have been properly terminated under the laws of the jurisdiction
in which the child was domiciled before being removed to the state of
Connecticut .... 262
Similar statutes have been enacted by Delaware, 63 Pennsylvania,264
257. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-45(b)(5) (West Supp. 1987).
258. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(H) (Baldwin 1987). The Ohio statute requires both that
the relinquish must be approved by the Service and that it must comply with the law of the child's
birth land. Id.
259. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-5-203(1) (Supp. 1987). The Colorado statute provides as follows:
A child may be available for adoption only upon: ... (h) Verification by the child place-
ment agency, a county department of social services, or the attorney for the petitioner in
any adoption proceeding that any custody obtained outside the state of Colorado was ac-
quired by: ... (III) Written and verified consent... which was executed in accord with
the laws of the state where granted or in substantial conformity with the laws of this state;
(i) Verification by the department of social services or its designated agent that any cus-
tody, obtained outside the state of Colorado was acquired by proceedings sanctioned by the
federal immigration and naturalization service in cooperation with the department of social
services whenever such cooperation is authorized or advised by federal law.
Id. It is not clear whether this law, as drafted, could achieve the purpose of foreclosing reex-
amination of a child's adoptability, because federal law does not authorize or advise cooperation by
federal and Colorado officials in sanctioning foreign proceedings.
260. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAWv § 115-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1988). See In re Pyung B., 83
Misc. 2d 794, 371 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1975).
261. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1988).
262. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-61j (West 1981).
263. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908(2) (1981) provides:
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Maine,265 Maryland, 266 and Michigan. 267 Application of foreign law
does not avoid the necessity of determining what the foreign law is or
whether it has been satisfied, but it has the virtue of directing the court,
agency, and petitioners toward a particular way of accomplishing a
transnational adoption.
A third type of statute facilitating transnational adoption dispenses
with proof of the chain of custody or guardianship for a child relin-
quished for adoption by foreign agencies or organizations. Only the last
foreign guardian in the chain need provide a written relinquishment, and
the formal requirements for such a relinquishment may be greatly liberal-
ized. The petition for adoption must include the guardian's relinquish-
ment and proof of the guardian's authority, such as a court order
appointing the guardian, but need not include a relinquishment by the
birth parents. Oregon law follows this approach:
An agency or other organization, public or private, located entirely
outside of this state, or an authorized officer or executive thereof, act-
ing in loco parentis, may consent to the adoption of a child under the
custody, control or guardianship of such agency or organization or of-
ficer or executive thereof, if such agency or organization or officer or
executive thereof is licensed or otherwise has authority in the jurisdic-
tion in which such agency or other organization is located to consent
to adoptions in loco parentis. When consent is given under this sec-
tion, no other consent is required. The license or other authority to
consent to adoption in loco parentis shall be conclusively presumed
upon the filing with the court of a duly certified statement from an
appropriate governmental agency of such other state that such agency
or organization or officer or executive is licensed or otherwise has au-
thority in such state to consent to adoptions in loco parentis.2 61
Similar statutes have been enacted by Georgia26 9 and Nebraska.27 °
If the parental rights of the parent or parents with respect to the child have not been legally
terminated, the consent shall be given as follows:
e. By the appropriate organization, agency or court in another country which acquired the
right to consent to an adoption in accordance with the laws of that country.
Id.
264. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2711(c) (Purdon Supp. 1987) provides: "Any consent given
outside this Commonwealth shall be valid for purposes of this section if it was given in accordance
with the laws of the jurisdiction where it was executed." Id.
265. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532(2)(E) (1964).
266. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-313.1 (Supp. 1987).
267. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.44(4) (WEST SuPp. 1987).
268. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.318(1) (1987).
269. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-17 (Supp. 1987).
270. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.07 (1984). The Nebraska statute requires only that a court,
official department, or government agency of the country of origin must supply a document stating
[Vol. 23:317
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Finally, Iowa27 1 and Wisconsin 272 have adopted statutes that com-
bine one or more of the above approaches by directing that a designated
administrative agency review documents supporting a transnational
adoption petition and determine whether the child is adoptable. Under
the Wisconsin statute, for example, the petitioners must file either an
order of a foreign court "freeing the child for adoption," or an "instru-
ment" (such as a written parental relinquishment) that frees the child for
adoption according to the law under which the instrument was issued. 3
If an order is filed, the order is sufficient evidence of the child's adoptabil-
ity.274 If an instrument is filed, it will be reviewed by officials of the state
child welfare agency, and the agency may make a recommendation to the
court as to whether the instrument is valid.275 The court retains the au-
thority to decide whether the instrument is valid, but must presume that
the instrument is valid unless it bears "substantial irregularities" on its
face or unless the state agency shows good cause for believing that the
instrument does not free the child for adoption.
2 76
Transnational adoption statutes such as these serve to eliminate
some of the uncertainties surrounding transnational adoption. They set
out a particular process which a state court must follow in a transna-
tional adoption. By varying degrees, these statutes also relieve the state
courts of some of the responsibility for determining whether a child is
adoptable. At one extreme, a state court may be required to accept the
Service's determination as to adoptability without further questioning.
However, under most of the statutes, the states have not fully abdicated
their authority to decide whether a child is adoptable.27 7 A state court or
agency may be required to determine whether the federal standard of
adoptability has been satisfied, or it may be required to determine and
that the child is adoptable because of a parental consent, abandonment, or termination of parental
rights. The placement agency must then provide its own consent to the adoption. Id.
271. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.15 (West 1981).
272. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.839 (West 1987).
273. Id. § 48.839(2)(a).
274. Id. § 48.839(3)(e).
275. Id. § 48.839(3)(c).
276. Id. § 48.839(3)(d).
277. See In re Adoption of Pyung B., 83 Misc. 2d 794, 371 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1975),
where the court held that a child might not be adoptable under New York's transnational adoption
statute even though the child qualified for an orphan visa:
To hold that § 115-a was enacted solely for purposes of the issuance of a visa and not to
benefit and protect the foreign child and adoptive parents as well, would require this Court
to abdicate its supervision of adoptions to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
This the Court cannot do. Adoption is exclusively a State responsibility. Immigration is
exclusively a federal responsibility. The two procedures should not be intermixed.
Id. at _, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
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apply foreign law with respect to the validity of a relinquishment or the
authority of a guardian. It is also possible that a court would hold that a
statutory preference for foreign law, like other rules of choice of law, is
subject to the state's public policies and notions of basic fairness.
Only a handful of states have enacted such statutes, and there are at
least two possible reasons why other states have not followed suit. First,
some of the transnational adoption statutes were enacted only after local
crises when questions were raised regarding the lawfulness of transna-
tional adoptions. The Georgia statute, for example, was enacted in re-
sponse to the Georgia Attorney General's opinion that transnational
adoption was not viable without strict compliance with Georgia's strin-
gent relinquishment requirements.278 In other states, the legal issues sur-
rounding transnational adoption may remain dormant until a judge or
other official presses for proof of a child's adoptability. Only then will
parties having a substantial interest in transnational adoption appeal to
the legislature.
Another possible reason that so many states have no transnational
adoption statutes is that they are reluctant to cede to federal or foreign
authorities the power to determine a child's adoptability. Even those
states that have enacted transnational adoption statutes usually have re-
served some of this power for their own courts.2 79 As noted earlier, fed-
eral and foreign standards of adoptability may be quite different from
those of a state, and legislators may be unprepared to sanction the adop-
tion of a child who, if born in that state, would not be adoptable. State
legislators may also lack confidence in the thoroughness of a foreign or
federal official's investigation of a child's adoptability. Widespread pub-
licity concerning alleged international black market baby-selling schemes
may contribute to the states' reluctance to relinquish their authority to
decide a child's adoptability.280
278. 85 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-34 (Aug. 27, 1985) (Ga. unofficial opinion).
279. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. See, eg., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-
313.1 (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 710.44(4) (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 115-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1988); R. SIMON & H. ALsrEIN, supra note 29, at 18.
280. See, eg., 85 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-34 (Aug. 27, 1985) (Ga. unofficial opinion) at 2-3
(state court must apply state rules regarding termination of parental rights, because "[t]o hold other-
wise would condone the practice of the sale or kidnapping of foreign children for ultimate adoption
in this state."); In re Jose L., 126 Misc. 2d 612, _, 483 N.Y.S.2d 929, 931 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984)
(denying a preadoption certificate because "the court cannot conclude that the transactions underly-
ing the instant application have not resulted in financial gain to one or more persons and do not
violate this State's strong public policy against 'trafficking' in children"),
International black markets for children for adoption have received widespread publicity. See,
e.g., J. ERICHSEN & H. ERICHSEN, supra note 99, at 143; Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in
Indochina, supra note 198, at 18; Jones, supra note 7, at 118; Kennedy, Why Adoptions Get Harder
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Even the involvement of federal immigration officials in determining
which children are eligible to immigrate may not be sufficient to allay
state concerns. It is a widely held opinion among social workers involved
in transnational adoption that United States immigration officials per-
form their investigation of a child's adoptability very diligently. On the
other hand, defense of the Service's process of determining adoptability is
greatly undermined by its failure to develop carefully considered guide-
lines governing the circumstances under which a parental relinquishment
may be accepted or under which a child may be regarded as abandoned,
lost, or separated from its parents. Thus, a state may be justified in its
hesitancy to rely on federal legal standards or federal investigative
authorities.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE EXISTING TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION
PROCESS AND PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The greatest flaw in the existing system of transnational adoption is
its division of authority between state and federal authorities in determin-
ing a child's adoptability. In any transnational adoption, state courts
may question or disagree that a child is adoptable, even though federal
immigration officials are satisfied that the child is adoptable and may
immigrate as an "immediate relative." 8' Thus, an ordinarily routine
and ceremonial proceeding risks becoming protracted and controversial.
This threat of controversy may seem at first blush a trivial concern in a
litigious society. The magnitude of the problem is better understood with
some appreciation of the special qualities and purposes of the adoption
process.
While adoption fulfills certain needs of adoptive parents, the inter-
ests of adoptive children are foremost in modem adoption law. A theme
running throughout adoption law and other areas of family law is that a
court should seek to serve the best interests of the child.282 Adoption is a
way of providing a homeless or disadvantaged child with a stable, sup-
portive, and nurturing family. Adoption was the preferred solution for
such children even before the baby shortage; a stable family is undoubt-
edly superior to institutionalization or transient foster home care.283 The
Every Year, U.S. News & World Rep., Sept. 20, 1982, at 54; Rule, supra note 4; Simons, supra note
4.
281. See, eg., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-a (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1988).
282. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4
(1979).
283. See generally id. at 22-26, 32-35.
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adoption process, therefore, ought to be designed with the best interests
of the child as its chief purpose. With this purpose in mind, three char-
acteristics become important to an effective transnational adoption
process.
First, the transnational adoption process should be designed so that
children are not unnecessarily or carelessly removed from their families
and homelands. American law insists that a child can be adopted only if
its birth parents' rights have been properly terminated.284 If a child's
parents are living, willing, and able to care for the child, the child's best
interests are not served by removing the child to another family. The
risks and potential trauma of a child's unnecessary removal to another
family is reason enough to insist that a child must not be adopted unless
its birth parents are deceased, have voluntarily relinquished any legal
right in the child, or have been deprived of their rights by judicial action
on grounds such as abandonment or gross neglect. Beyond the best in-
terests of any particular child, the integrity and stability of families and
the well-being of children in general demand a restrictive standard of
adoptability.
Second, the transnational adoption process should be designed so
that a final determination of adoptability is made at the outset of the
process, before the child's immigration, by federal officials stationed in
the child's birth land. An investigation of the child's adoptability is best
conducted where witnesses or documents concerning the child's origin
are likely to be conveniently accessible, and in most cases this will be the
country from which the child will be emigrating. Federal officials sta-
tioned overseas are more likely than state court judges to be familiar with
the local language, customs, and legal system. This familiarity is un-
doubtedly useful in conducting an investigation and reviewing evidence
of a child's origin and availability for adoption. A satisfactory investiga-
tion of a child's adoptability usually could not be conducted months after
the child's relinquishment and immigration to the United States. A state
court thousands of miles from the child's origin, examining the circum-
stances of a child's relinquishment for adoption many months after the
fact, likely will have no convenient or practical access to relevant docu-
ments beyond those supplied by the agency or petitioners in support of
the petition. Witnesses, if known, will be difficult to locate and impossi-
ble or extraordinarily expensive to examine. To the extent that foreign
284. See, eg., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.41 (West Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-
48(c)(1) (WEsT SuPP. 1987).
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law is relevant or applicable under choice of law principles, neither the
parties nor the state court is likely to have a reasonable understanding of
foreign law or to have convenient access to foreign legal materials, for-
eign lawyers, or foreign legal scholars.
Third, the transnational adoption process should be designed so that
an early determination of a child's adoptability is granted the same final-
ity to which a United States court's determination would ordinarily be
entitled. If the initial determination is reached by a reasonably reliable
process, the child's best interests are not served by allowing state courts
to reconsider freely whether the child is adoptable months after the
child's immigration and placement with its prospective adoptive family.
Within that time, the petitioners and child may have bonded as strongly
as any birth family. In that event, the child's later removal from the
petitioners' custody would be severely traumatic for the child and the
family, and would postpone the child's settlement in a permanent family.
Even if the court grants the decree, the very threat of such a removal
may have retarded the development of a healthy family relationship. The
prospective parents and child may postpone bonding, Withholding affec-
tion while a risk remains that the family will be separated.28 5 If the con-
troversy is not quickly resolved, it may continue to interfere with normal
family life for months or even years while the state court system struggles
to deal with the complexities of transnational adoption.
The existing process of transnational adoption achieves these goals
only in part. At the outset of the process, the child's adoptability may be
decided by a foreign official or tribunal, but there is no guarantee that its
decision will accord with even the most basic values of American adop-
tion law.286 Immigration officials conduct a further investigation to de-
termine the adoptability of a child, but neither the Service nor Congress
has ever carefully considered what standards should be followed in deter-
mining that a child has been relinquished for adoption or has been aban-
doned, lost, or separated from its parents.
Even if the determination made by the Service were reasonably reli-
able, that determination is not final.2 87 Its only legal effect is to over-
come one obstacle to the issuance of an immigrant visa. The
determination may be challenged or questioned months later and
thousands of miles from a child's origin when a state court decides
285. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, supra note 281, at 17-22, 31-37, 42-43.
286. See generally id.
287. See supra notes 260 & 278 and accompanying text.
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whether to grant a petition for adoption. Yet a sufficient examination of
a foreign child's adoptability by a state court is exceedingly difficult, and
may be impossible. Permitting a state court to freely reexamine the issue
of adoptability also injects uncertainty and controversy into the proceed-
ing and may significantly delay the legal and emotional security of an
adoption decree.
No comprehensive solution to the difficulties of transnational adop-
tion is possible except at the federal level. A state court's reexamination
of adoptability might be prevented by arguments based on comity, choice
of law, or the act of state doctrine, but the very fact that petitioners must
rely on such arguments contributes to delay and uncertainty in the pro-
cess. A few states have facilitated the process with special transnational
adoption legislation, but such laws are not widespread, and state legisla-
tion alone cannot be sufficient to address all the problems of transna-
tional adoption. Many of these state statutes require a state court to
defer to foreign law or foreign officials, but state courts and agencies are
not likely to possess the resources to interpret, confirm, and apply foreign
law and foreign orders or decrees.
Moreover, state legislation legitimizing a foreign relinquishment or
applying foreign law is a one-sided solution. To accept foreign laws and
decrees without question is to forsake the system of values that has
evolved in American adoption law. Existing federal immigration law
provides some limitation against the immigration of children who are not
adoptable, but federal law is too vague to act as a reliable safeguard.
Until the process by which federal officials make their investigation and
determination is scrutinized and held to some agreeable standard, the
states may be understandably unwilling to surrender any part of their
responsibility for granting or denying adoptions.
A comprehensive solution would have two parts: first, the develop-
ment of federal substantive and procedural standards for investigating
and determining adoptability; and second, legislation giving a measure of
finality to the determination of immigration officials. The first part
would assure sufficient investigation and determination; the second part
would provide afinal determination at the earliest stage of the transna-
tional adoption process.
Federal standards for adoptability might take existing immigration
standards and widely accepted state standards as a starting point. How-
ever, the existing immigraton standards are ill-defined, and the state stan-
dards are often too rigorous for transnational adoption. An over-
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abundance of caution may also be deleterious to the best interests of a
child. In many corners of the world, there is simply no way to document
every child's origin. Under conditions of war, civil disorder, or severe
poverty, overindulgence in American standards of proof and procedure
may only serve to expose a child to prolonged risk in a dangerous envi-
ronment.2 88 Relaxed procedures and standards may be appropriate in
times of great urgency. However, the need for greater flexibility and jus-
tifiable liberality does not require abandonment of standards or fair
procedure.
Federal standards of adoptability would also have to take account of
the myriad differences in circumstances from one country to another and
of the various causes of adoptability. It may be necessary to require im-
migration officials assigned to each country to develop separate plans
based on the state of public record keeping, local customs, and the suffi-
ciency and availability of each nation's own administrative or judicial
process for determining adoptability. The involvement of approved
adoption agencies in some countries might be necessary to curtail the
possibility of black marketing.
One may ask whether the American officials involved in transna-
tional adoption should be concerned with the issue of adoptability at all if
a foreign nation has, by law, custom, or some official action, acknowl-
edged the child's availability for emigration and adoption in a foreign
land. The answer is that the integrity of the adoptive family would be ill-
served by leaving significant questions about a child's origin unresolved.
Moreover, transnational adoption might cease as an option for prospec-
tive adoptive parents if the process fails to contain adequate safeguards to
prevent the emigration of unadoptable children. Nations that are signifi-
cant sources of children for American adoptive parents generally have
cooperated only reluctantly and out of need. These nations remain sensi-
tive about the emigration of their children and would likely impose
greater restrictions on adoptions by foreigners if it were practical to do
so. If United States officials were indifferent to the issue of adoptability,
many nations from which children now emigrate might eventually pro-
hibit emigration for the purpose of adoption by foreigners, or they may
prefer parents of nations other than the United States.289
288. During the Vietnam War, the infant mortality rate in Vietnamese orphanages was as high
as ninety percent. Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina, supra note 198, at 86.
289. Fears that children were being improperly removed to the U.S. for adoption have caused
some nations to attempt to restrict transnational adoption of their children. See generally id.
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The second part of this proposal, giving the initial Service determi-
nation of adoptability limited finality, would preclude a state court's un-
warranted reconsideration of adoptability. State courts would remain
chiefly responsible for determining parental qualifications and family
compatability, but the issue of the validity of a relinquishment would be
removed from their domain. The Service's determination in itself would
serve as irrebuttable proof of a child's adoptability, regardless of a state's
own standards of adoptability for children born in the United States.
While the Service's determination would not have the effect of an adop-
tion decree, it would settle the adoptability issue on which an adoption
hinges.
Possibly, a birth parent may oppose a petition on substantial
grounds such as fraud, mistake, or undue influence in the granting of a
relinquishment. Even the most carefully designed process cannot guar-
antee that there will be no error. However, granting finality to the Ser-
vice's decision that the child is "adoptable" would not necessarily
foreclose a court from hearing evidence concerning the circumstances of
a relinquishment. State courts should not be required to shut their doors
to a truly aggrieved birth parent. While the child may be "adoptable," a
court still must determine whether the requested adopton is in the child's
best interests, and the circumstances by which the child became adopta-
ble may be relevant to the child's best interests.290 A state court's power
to decide a child's best interests would permit the court to hear the birth
parent's challenge and, if necessary, deny the petition and return the
child to the custody of the birth parent.
V. CONCLUSION
Transnational adoption is an increasingly important facet of immi-
gration and adoption in the United States. However, transnational adop-
tion has received surprisingly little attention from lawmakers and legal
scholars. Congress has enacted legislation facilitating the immigration of
prospective adoptive children, but has not endeavored any substantial
regulation of the adoption process. A few states have enacted special
legislation dealing with transnational adoptions, but the great majority
continue to rely on the same legislation that was enacted primarily for
adoption of locally born children. The adoption of a foreign-born child,
however, can raise difficult legal problems that are rare or unknown in
the adoption of American-born children. These problems arise partly
290. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
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from the difficulty of reconciling foreign and domestic law, and partly
from the failure of American lawmakers to develop a rational allocation
of authority among foreign, federal, and state officials.
Despite the early views of Congress that large-scale transnational
adoption was a temporary phenomena, transnational adoption has not
only grown over the past forty years, but is likely to continue for the
foreseeable future. Transnational adoption is both an important solution
to the shortage of adoptable children in the United States and the
shortage of adoptive parents in many developing nations. Greater atten-
tion must now be focused on the unique problems of transnational adop-
tion in order that the process will not be jeopardized by poorly formed
rules and standards at the immigration phase, and overly-restrictive rules
at the state adoption phase.
Legislative reform at the federal level could solve many of the
problems inherent in transnational adoptions. Such reform should focus
on three goals. First, the transnational adoption process should require a
restrictive definition of "adoptability" so that the birth family's rights are
protected. Second, the process also should be designed so that the immi-
gration officials' finding of adoptability is made at the very beginning of
the process in the land where the child is born. Finally, the federal offi-
cials' finding of adoptability should be given the same finality accorded a
judicial determination. These reforms, while sketched only in general
terms, would greatly improve the transnational adoption process.
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